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EMU REVISITED :
ARE WE MAKING A CONSTITUTION?
WHAT CONSTITUTION ARE WE MAKING?
FRANCIS SNYDER
1. INTRODUCTION
(A) What Is At Stake in  EMU
The European Union has an unfinished constitution. Since its inception
European integration has been marked by discord about its objectives
and, correspondingly, a lack of conceptual clarity in their legal
expression. Now, however, it is also characterised  by much greater
politicisation, a more broadly based scepticism about (if not opposition to)
its policies, and an  increasing drift towards what is often described as a
polycentric polity.
Economic and monetary union (EMU) in such circumstances
involves high stakes, both for the European Union (EU) in particular and
for European integration in general.1 From a broad constitutional
                                                        
1 For their contributions to this article I wish to thank (in alphabetical order) Michael
Artis, Vassil Breskovski, Stephen Clarkson, Emir Lawless, Massimo La Torre,
Miguel Poiares Maduro, Raimond Marimon, Michael Morgalla, Candido Garcia
Molyneux, Machteld Nijsten, Marcello Oviedo, Martin Schapiro, and Anne-Lise
Strahtmann. Early drafts of different parts of the article were presented at the Annual
Conference of the Association Internationale des Jeunes Avocats, Florence, Italy, 3
September 1997; the Conference on Compliance and Enforcement of European
Community Law, University of Utrecht, Netherlands, 2-3 October, 1997; the Conference
on 'European Law: The Basis for the Construction of the European Union', Institute of
European Studies of Macau, Macau, 9 May 1998; Fudan University, Shanghai, 11 May
1998; Centre for European Studies, University of Wuhan, 15 May 1998; and Institute of
European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 19 May 1998. I am
especially grateful to my respective hosts, Christopher Vajda Q.C. , Professor John
Vervaele, Dra. Maria do Ceu Esteves, Professor Dai Bingran, Professor Zeng
Linliang, and Professor Qiu Yuanlan and Professor Zhou Rongyao, as to the
participants on each occasion for discussion and comments. The article was completed
during my stay at the Chinese Academy of Social Scinces (CASS), Beijing, as the first
Robert Schuman Professor under the EU-China Higher Education Cooperation
Programme. I wish to express my gratitute to the Programme and also to my hosts at the
CASS, Professor Qiu Yuanlan (Director, Institute of European Studies), Professor Zhou
Rongyao (Director, Centre for European Studies), and Dr Zhou Hong (Deputy Directive,
Centre for European Studies). None of these people has read the final version of this
article, so more than the usual disclaimer applies.
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perspective,2 these stakes are essentially three-fold. First, EMU is a test
of some of the EU's basic constitutional principles, such as the single
institutional framework, the division of powers, subsidiarity, and social
cohesion.3 Second, its fate will be decisive with regard to certain
constitutionalising processes, which help to determine whether a
constitution in merely the material sense (sens matériel) can be
transformed into a constitution also in the subjective sense; such
processes include regional integration, legitimation and the creation of
social solidarity. Third, EMU could be crucial in the development of a
real EU legal and constitutional culture, one which extends beyond
merely  administrative, legal and political elites to embrace all EU
citizens and even residents.
 EMU, as I have argued elsewhere,4 is a metaphor for the
European Union. It represents the culmination of a process set in train
by the founding Treaties, consolidated in the Maastricht Treaty, and left
virtually untouched by the Treaty of Amsterdam. The debate about EMU
thus is a debate about the future of the EU as a polity, the European
social model, and the nature of European identity. EMU was intended
from the beginning to be (and may still be) a milestone in the history of
European integration, anchoring the internal market, crystallising
political integration, and establishing the EU as a major player in
international financial markets. It may prove, however, to be a millstone
around the neck of a fledgling, causing the young European Union to
sink in the turbulent waters of deflation, enlargement, postmodern
politics, and globalisation.
(B) Approach of The Article
The present article aims to contribute to this debate. Its approach,
following the editors' guidelines, is to analyse EMU in the light of the
gradual development of this area of the law over the course of the
Community and Union’s history. The article considers the relevant
                                                        
2 See F. Snyder, 'General Course on European Community Law: Constitutional Law of
the European Union', in  Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law 1995
(Kluwer, 1998), 1-117.
3 Also relevant are the principle of an open market economy, convergence, and
maintenance of the acquis communautaire: see Ernst-Jachim Mestmaecker, 'De la
Communauté économique à l'Union économique et monétaire', (1995) 1 Revue des
Affaires Européennes 111-121 at pp 111-112.
4 F. Snyder, 'EMU - Metaphor for European Union? Institutions, Rules and Types of
Regulation', in R. Dehousse (ed)., Europe after Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union?
(Law Books in Europe, 1994), 63-99.
© 1998 Francis Snyder
5
political, economic and social forces which have shaped the creation and
evolution of this body of law, and, where possible, the impact of that law
on the EC, the EU and the Member States. Finally, it examines the
interaction between the various institutional, doctrinal and other
influences in the making, shaping and application of the law.
Such an approach in itself gives the lie to any simple notion of
EMU as the result of gradual straightforward  changes in legal doctrine
or positive law, still less as the product of a legal, institutional and
political process which was virtually predestined. Indeed, once we move
away from any narrow conception of EMU in terms of  so-called 'black
letter' law, it becomes difficult to describe EMU in terms of evolution at
all. Evolution is an extremely complex and highly controversial concept.5
In legal studies, and even in legal anthropology, evolutionary
approaches have been few in number and of limited persuasiveness.6 Of
more utility in respect of EMU might be Marx's genealogical method,7 or
Vansina's conception of process-models,8 but such a deep historical
methods, which are usually applied in the study of long-term historical
changes, may be inappropriate here.
I wish, however, to retain three points which recourse to the
notion of evolution might suggest. First, evolution refers to change over
time. Certainly as applied to legal principles, processes and culture, it is
inevitably contested and full of conflict. In few areas of EU law is this
more true than with EMU.  Second, the concept of evolution  tends
unfortunately to focus our attention on the winners. In studying society,
                                                        
5 As to its complexity, see 'Evolution', The New Encyclopaedia Britannica,
Micropaedia, Vol. 4, 623, and 'The Theory of Evolution', The New Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Macropaedia, Vol. 18, 981-1011 ( 18th edition, 1974, reprinted 1985,
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.). As to its controversial character, see e.g. S..J. Gould,
'Darwinian Fundamentalism', (1997) XLIV The New York Review of Books (June 12)
34, and related correspondence. See also 'Biology isn't destiny', The Economist,
February 14 1998, pp 97-99.
6 As to examples, see E.A. Hoebel, The Law of Primitive Man (Harvard University
Press, 1954) and A.S. Diamond, Primitive Law, Past and Present (Methuen, 1971). For
a useful correction, see S.F. Moore, 'Legal Liability and Evolutionary Interpretation:
Some Aspects of Strict Liability, Self-Help and Collective Responsibility', in M.
Gluckman (ed), The Allocation of Responsibility (Manchester University Press, 1972).
For a recent critique, see La Torre, 'Rules, Institutions, Transformations:
Considerations on the "Evolution of Law" Paradigm', (1997) 10 Ratio Juris  316.
7 See K. Marx, Grundisse: Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy (trans. M.
Nicolaus, 1973, Penguin Books Ltd.)
8 Jan Vansina, 'The Use of Process-Models in African History', in Jan Vansina,
Raymond Mauny and L.V. Thomas (eds), The Historian in Tropical Africa  (Studies
presented and discussed at the Fourth International African Seminar at the University
of Dakar, Senegal, 1961) (Oxford University Press for the International African
Institute, 1964), pp 375-389.
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however, including law in society, we must avoid reading history
backwards and forgetting the losers. The outcomes of social change are
rarely predetermined: EMU, in general or in its present form, was and
is not inevitable. Third, evolution often involves path dependence and
lock-in, such that the outcomes of past conflicts establishes patterns or
sets the agenda for the future.9 EMU, despite its short history, is a prime
example.
EMU has usually been treated from an economic or economic
policy perspective. The former asks whether EMU makes economic-
theoretical sense, while the latter focuses on the extent to which it is
required for the optimal functioning of the internal market. Here I
concentrate instead on the legal aspects of EMU as the complex result of
a series of bargains and compromises, driven mainly though not
continuously by particular interests, and set within the broader context
of systemic changes in Europe and in the international political
economy. This approach includes a European perspective, which
considers EMU as one more step towards EU political integration. It also
takes account of the perspective of national governments, which have
often adopted a strategy of seeking to introduce by means of EU
institutions, including EMU, economic policies which might be difficult
to implement through national political institutions alone.
(C) Argument and Organisation
The main lines of the argument put forward here can be summarised as
follows.
First, EMU was created mainly for political rather than economic
reasons. In particular it was intended to be an essential, but not the
only, part of European political integration.
Second, the overtly political aspects of EMU, designed to be a
counterweight to its economic or financial aspects, were negotiated away
during the compromise that led to the inclusion of EMU in the
Maastricht Treaty. They included an increase in EC budget for
redistributive purposes, the deployment of other economic policy
instruments, and greater political accountability.
                                                        
9 As to path dependence and lock-in generally, see Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns
and Path Dependence in the Economy (University of Michigan Press, 1994). As to EC
law in particular, see Pierson, 'The Path to European Integration: A Historical
Institutionalist Analysis', (1996) 29 Comparative Political Studies 123.
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Third, the institutional structure and substantive provisions of
EMU, excluding the convergence criteria, which were agreed at the end
of the Maastricht Intergovernmental Conference, were mainly the
product of a small group of monetary experts. This group was
characterised by substantial structural, organisational and even
sometimes individual continuity, thus giving great weight to the
economic and financial aspects of EMU.
Fourth, monetary institutions and monetary policy, especially
before being put into practice,10 would not usually appear to raise great
issues of political controversy and theory. The development of EMU has
done so however because it crystallised conflicting views among Member
States, organisations and individuals about the nature and purpose of
European integration and because it occurred in a historically specific
context.  See from this perspective,  EMU has served both as a stimulant
and as a proxy for broader debates about decision-making concerning
monetary policy, the future of European integration, and the meaning
and effects of globalisation. Even though not always realised consciously
or articulated in political terms, the links between globalisation and
EMU raised profound questions about personal, national and European
identities.
Fifth, these developments and controversies have had very specific
implications for the unfinished EU constitution. EMU as a whole
exemplifies a trend towards an increasing role of the European Council
as a Janus-faced gatekeeper, an approfondissement of multi-level
governance in the sense of greater interpenetration between EU and
national political arenas, and greater institutional and normative
heterogeneity in the making and implementation of important EU (and
EC) policies.
Sixth, from a broader constitutional standpoint, two main points
emerge. On the one hand, EMU has contributed perhaps more than any
other policy to the emergence of politics in the EU, which now clearly
                                                        
10 It seems clear, however, that public reaction in Europe and elsewhere to monetary
policy, even before put into practice, is now influenced by widely known precedents of
previous IMF deflationary policies. In the EMU context, this demonstrates once again
the extent to which EU policies and political debates are influenced by the broader
international context, particularly international institutions and international
events, even though individuals might not always consciously or immediately
recognise this to be the case. It is also true that EMU was not the only factor to stimulate
political debate: see Panos Tsakaloyannis, '"The Acceleration of History" and the
Reopening of the Political Debate in the European Community', (1991) 14 Revue
d'Intégration Européenne / Journal of European Integration 103-102.
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has the character of a non-state polity. On the other hand, the
substantial growth and popular salience of the European Council can be
described as a form of legitimation without democratisation, if by
'democracy' we mean participation in governance either via direct
deliberation or by means of directly elected representatives as well as the
fragmentation rather than the concentration of power. When viewed in
the context of European integration and the development of the European
Union,  EMU thus is a high-risk political strategy. It is not immutable or
irreversible, and if it fails, there is a risk that because EMU and the EU
are now so intertwined,  they both become unravelled.
The remainder of this article consists of three main parts. Part 2
deals with the construction of the legal framework of EMU. Part 3
discusses the relationship between politics, interests, and policies in this
process. Part 4 considers certain controversial issues and legal
problems. The conclusion summarises some of the constitutional
implications.
2. A CHRONOLOGY OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The origins of European monetary integration predate the European
Economic Community (EEC).11 The European Payments Union came
into operation in 1950.12  An intergovernmental institution, it served as a
clearing house, which provided for the multilateral settlement of
payments and for short-term credit for balance of payments adjustments
among participating states.  
The assumption that national governments (now Member States)
retained power over economic, cyclical and monetary policies also
                                                        
11 The following account draws especially  on Daniel Gros and Niels Thygesen, European
Monetary Integration (Longman,1992); John Driffill and Massimo Beber (eds), A
Currency for Europe: Currency as an Element of Division or Union in Europe (Lothian
Foundation Press, 1991); Klaus Gretschman, 'EMU: Thoughtful Wish or Wishful
Thinking', in Klaus Gretschmann (ed), Economic and Monetary Union: Implications
for National Policy-Makers (European Institute of Public Administration, 1993), pp 3-
23; Peter B. Kenen, Economic and Monetary Union in Europe: Moving beyond
Maastricht (Cambridge University Press, 1995); Glenda Goldstone Rosenthal, The
Men Behind the Decisions: Cases in European Policy-Making (Lexington Books, 1975)
pp 26-30, 101-125;  Loukas Tsoukalis, 'Economic and Monetary Union: The Primacy of
High Politics', in Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the
European Union (Oxford University Press, 3rd  edition 1996), pp 279-299; and Horst
Ungerer, A Concise History of European Monetary Integration: From EPU to EMU
(Quorum Books, 1997). See also P. Welfens (ed), European Monetary Integration (Springer, 2nd
edition 1994),
12 Accord sur l'establissement d'une Union europeenne de paiements du 19 septembre
1950 (Organisation europeenne de cooperation economique, 1954)
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underlay the 1957 Treaty of Rome, but the exercise of these powers was
now subject to a new institutional framework and new legal obligations.
Within the broad objectives assigned to the EEC by Article 2 EEC,13
Article 6(1) provided that  ‘Member States, acting in close collaboration
with the institutions of the Community, shall coordinate their respective
economic policies to the extent that it is necessary to attain the objectives
of this Treaty ....’ For this purpose, Member States were to regard their
conjunctural policies and exchange rate policies as matters of common
concern.14 The EEC was granted power to take certain limited action in
each area.15 Each Member State, to quote the heady idealistic  language
of the Treaty, was 'to pursue the economic policy needed to ensure the
equilibrium of its overall balance of payments and to maintain
confidence in its currency, while taking care to ensure a high level of
employment and a stable level of prices.'16 To facilitate achievement of
these aims, Member States were required to coordinate their economic
policies and for this purpose to provide for cooperation between inter alia
their central banks.17 A Monetary Committee with advisory status was
established to promote coordination of monetary policies 'to the full
extent needed for the functioning of the common market.'18
With regard to capital movements, the basic principle was that,
during the transitional period and to the extent necessary to ensure the
proper functioning of the common market, Member States were
progressively to  abolish between themselves all restrictions of
movements of capital belonging the persons resident in the Member
States and any discrimination based on nationality or in the place of
residence of the parties or on the place where the capital is invested.19
Current payments were to be liberalised by the end of the first stage at
                                                        
13 In the words of Art. 2 EEC, ‘It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a
Common Market and progressively approximating the economic policies of the
Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of
economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an
accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the Member
States.’
14 See Art. 103(1) (conjunctural policies) and Art.  107(1) (exchange rate policies).
15 See Art. 103(2)-(4) and Art. 107(2).
16 Art. 104 EEC.
17 Art. 105(1) , first paragraph, EEC. As to economic policy coordin ation, see Richard N.
Cooper, 'Economic Interdependence and Coordination of Economic Policies', in R.W.
Jones and P.B. Kenen (eds),  Handbook of International Economics, vol. II (Elsevier
Science Publishers, 1985), pp 1195-1234.
18 Art. 105(2). EEC.
19 Art. 67(1) EEC.
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the latest.20 These provisions were to be implemented progressively.21 As
to capital movements involving third countries, Member States were
progressively to coordinate their exchange rate policies, within the
framework of Council directives, adopted unanimously and
endeavouring to attain the highest possible degree of liberalisation.22  A
standstill clause applied to new exchange restrictions.23  Provision was
made for safeguard measures in the event that capital movements led to
disturbances in the functioning of the capital market in any Member
States.24 There was however no reference to any regional currency
union, which in any event would have been wholly unrealistic.25
Three further developments occurred soon after the EEC Treaty
came into force. The European Investment Bank (EIB) was established
in 1958 as an independent credit institution of the EEC with its seat in
Luxembourg.26 The following year, the European Monetary Agreement
(EMA) replaced the EPU, which had ensured complete currency
convertibility between most European states. The EMA provided a fund
for coping with temporary balance of payments difficulties, and rules
were laid down for the multilateral settlement of payments through the
Basle-based Bank of International Settlements (BIS)27 Then, in March
1960 the EEC Council issued a decision to improve coordination of
Member States' short-term economic policies.28
The early 1960s, the 'golden age of the Community', saw increased
interest in European monetary integration, mainly as a response to
international monetary instability and 'the perceived need (especially by
                                                        
20 Art. 67(2) EEC.
21 Art. 69 EEC.
22 Art. 70(1) EEC.
23 Art. 71, first paragraph, EEC. The second paragraph of this Article provided that
Member States declare their readiness to go beyond the degree of liberalisation of
capital movements provided for in the preceding articles in so far as their economic
situation, in particular the situation of their balance of payments, so permits.
24 Art. 73(1) EEC.
25 See Loukas Tsoukalis, 'Economic and Monetary Union: The Primacy of High
Politics', in Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the
European Union (Oxford University Press, 3rd  edition 1996), pp 279-299 at p 281, who
points out that the international monetary system was based on the  gold standard,
European countries were still concerned about a dollar shortage, and national
governments followed firmly  Keynesian policies.
26 Treaty establishing the European Community, Protocol (No.A) On the Statute of the
European Investment Bank.
27 Accord monetaire europeen  du 5 aout 1955 amende par les Protocoles additionales
Nos. 2 et 3 et les Decision prises par l'Organisation europeenne de cooperation
economique jusque' auler aout 1960 (OECE, 1960).
28 EEC Council Decision of  9 March 1960 on Co-ordination of the Conjunctural Policies
of the Member States, OJ 9.5.1960 L31/764.
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the French) to insulate Europe from the vagaries of the U.S. dollar'.29  In
July 1960 the Council enacted the First Capital Directive, taking a
modest step toward implementing Article 67 EC on free movement of
capital.30 In October 1962 the EEC Commission issued 'The Action
Programme of the Community for the Second Stage', which included a
chapter to economic policy and a chapter to monetary policy.31 It
suggested that from end of the transition period, if not sooner, the
Member States should move to a system of fixed exchange rates with a
narrow band of variation, and also that by the end of a third stage a full
monetary union could be envisaged. The Second Council Directive on the
free movement of capital was adopted in December 1962.32
 In June of the following year the Commission recommended
strengthening existing monetary cooperation in meetings of ministers of
finance, the Monetary Committee and the Short-Term Economic Policy
Committee. These recommendations were adopted in a series of
decisions and declarations issued by the Council on 8 May 1964.33  This
provided for establishment of a committee of governors of the central
banks, which  subsequently became a central institution for coordinating
monetary policy as well as credit and lending operations in the EEC. It
also provided for the creation of a budgetary policy committee, composed
of senior officials of the finance ministries of the Member States and of
representations from the Commission. The Member States also agreed
to consult each other before altering exchange rates in international
monetary affairs and to hold discussions in the Monetary Committee
before ‘taking steps connected with the general working of the
international monetary system, having recourse to funds available
                                                        
29 Loukas Tsoukalis, 'Economic and Monetary Union: The Primacy of High Politics',
in Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union
(Oxford University Press, 3rd  edition 1996), pp 279-299 at p 281.
30 OJ 12.7.60 L921/60. As to amendments, see the Second Capital Directive infra . See
also Council Directive 85/583, OJ 31.12.85 L372/39, and Council Directive 86/566, OJ
26.11.86 L332/22.
31 Memorandum de la Commission sur le programme d'action de la communauté
pendant la  deuxième étape, COM (62) 300, 24.10.1962, p.107.
32 Council Directive 63/21, OJ 22.1.63 L62/63.
33 Council Decision of 8 May 1964 on Co-operation between Member States in the Filed of
International Monetary Relations, OJ 21.51964 L77/1207; Council Decision of 8 May
1964 on Co-operation between the Central Banks of the Member States of the EEC, OJ
21.5.1964 L77/1206; Council Decision of 8 May 1964 on Co-operation between the
Competent Government Departments of Member States in the Filed of Budgetary
Policy, OJ 21.5.1964 L77/1205.
© 1998 Francis Snyder
12
under international agreements or participating in large-scale support
arrangements on behalf of nonmember countries’ .34
In September 1964 the Commission issued a policy statement
entitled 'Initiative 1964' in the form of a memorandum to the Council
and the Member States. With regard to monetary policy, it stated:
The Commission considers that the aims set out in its Action
Programme of October 1962 have become even more pressing and that
they should be examined in the light of experience. The interpenetration
of markets which has meanwhile come about between the Member
States makes progress in the field of monetary policy increasingly
urgent.
The aim of the Community is not merely to expand trade between
the Member States; it implies merging the six markets in a single
internal market and the establishment of an economic union. It
therefore appears indispensable to adapt the monetary policy of the Six to
the degree of integration already attained in other fields.
The Commission will submit without delay to the Council
proposals for the progressive introduction of a monetary union.’35
These ambitious schemes were elaborated by the Commission, which
linked an increase in its own political fortunes to that of the Community.
They remained, however, mainly on paper. The principal practical
measures to be adopted were the EEC's first medium-term economic
policy programme in 196736 and a second such programme in 1968.37
Both of these initiatives were powered by the Commission in conjunction
with expert committees, without requiring the Council to adopt
measures with a higher political profile and more direct political
implications.
The late 1960s was a period of political, economic and monetary
instability. This put paid to any ambitious proposals for European
monetary integration, even if they had been on the political agenda of
more Member States at the time. But, even in the aftermath of the
Luxembourg Accords, it also facilitated more limited Commission
                                                        
34 Glenda Goldstone Rosenthal, The Men behind the Decisions (Lexington Books, 1975),
p 27.
35 European Economic Community, Official Spokesman of the Commission,
Information Memo P-59/64 (Brussels, October 1964), pp 4-5
36 JO 25.4.1967 79/1513.      
37 JO  30.5.1969 L129/1.
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initiatives which were designed to foster greater coordination in
economic and monetary matters. Though unsuccessful in the short-
term, these initiatives set the agenda for the future: they aired the
issues, established the terms of debate, and provided points of orientation
for subsequent developments.
On 5 December 1968 the Commission submitted to the Council  a
memo  'on appropriate policy in the Community on current economic
and monetary problems', announcing that before 15 February 1969 it
would propose the creation of new means of monetary cooperation. The
Council at  its meeting of 12 December 1968 reached broad agreement on
the need for greater convergence of economic policies and for
intensifying monetary cooperation.38 The result was the Commission
memorandum known as the 'Barre Plan', named after the then Vice-
President of the Commission Raymond Barre.39 It contained three
recommendations: closer coordination of short-term economic policies,
convergence of national medium-term economic policy orientations, and
establishment of Community machinery for monetary cooperation
through short-term arrangements for monetary support and
possibilities for medium-term financial assistance
The Barre Plan was highly contested, and its principal concrete
result was a Council Decision on the coordination of Member States'
short-term economic policies.40  With an eye on subsequent
developments, however, one can say that this debate generated four
crucial points of lasting significance.41
First, this was the first manifestation of the split between
'economists' and 'monetarists'. The former group, in particular
Germany, wanted economic union first: in their view, economic
convergence was a precondition for monetary integration. The latter, in
particular France, wanted monetary union first: they saw the
introduction of a common monetary policy as a means of fostering
convergence among the Member States' diverse national economies.
                                                        
38 European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, European
Atomic Energy Community, Second General Report on the Activities of the Community
1968 (Brussels-Luxembourg, February 1969), p 111.
39 ECSC-EEC-EAEC, Secretariat General of the Commission, ‘Commission
Memorandum to the Council on the Co-ordination of Economic Policies and Monetary
Co-operation within the Community' (Supplement to Bulletin of the European
Communities, No. 3-1969) (Brussels, Publishing Services of the European
Communities, 1969).
40 JO 25.7.1969 L183/41.
41 See Glenda Goldstone Rosenthal, The Men Behind the Decisions: Cases in European
Policy-Making (Lexington Books, 1975) , pp 102-105.
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Second, the support for and opposition to the Barre Plan reflected
national governments' views not only of the priority of economic policy or
monetary policy but also of the future shape of an eventual EEC polity.
Thus Germany, Italy, and Belgium supported the Barre Plan in part
because the coordination of economic policy seemed eventually to
presage greater political integration.42 France, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands opposed it, in part because, in the words of then French
Minister of Defence Michel Debré, 'There is no such thing as monetary
Europe....Europe is either political and has a currency or it does not
exist and has no currency'.43
Third, the Barre Plan debate revealed both the limits of EEC
competence and also the fact that the domain of economic and monetary
policy was already characterised by a unusual degree of multi-level
governance. For example, Coreper lacked the competence to discuss all
aspects of the Barre Plan. Some aspects fell within the competence of the
Member States, notably within the powers of national central banks or
national budgetary authorities. Other aspects were traditionally dealt
with by international monetary bodies. The EEC response was to
encourage the creation of networks linking specialised committees.
 Fourth, and also presaging future developments (at least if we
read history backwards), it should also be noted that the eventual
agreement in July 1968 agreement on the Council decision was subject to
numerous hesitations and much reservation. It was considered to be the
lesser of two evils, and its adoption was facilitated by the fact that 'none
of the proposed mechanisms was to enter into effect without
implementing legislation'.44 These well-known features of Community
decision-making have also characterised recent debates about EMU.45        
                                                        
42 As to the German ordo-liberal view of the role of EMU in the EEC economic
constitution, see Manfred E. Streit and  Werner Mussler, 'The Economic Constitution
of the European Community: From 'Rome' to 'Maastricht'' (1995) 1 European Law
Journal  5-30.
43 Commission of the European Communities, Monthly Bulletin, 1071, no. 3, p. 97,
quoted in Glenda Goldstone Rosenthal, The Men Behind the Decisions: Cases in
European Policy-Making (Lexington Books, 1975), p. 103, who also remarks various
differences of opinion within each of the two groups. It is also striking that to note the
expression at European level of national political differences, here between Debré and
Barre, as well as the inclusion within the single 'economists' group of both Germany
and Italy, nowadays considered to represent extreme differences of opinion with
regard to EMU.
44 Glenda Goldstone Rosenthal, The Men Behind the Decisions: Cases in European
Policy-Making (Lexington Books, 1975),  p. 106.
45 Schneider and Cederman identify the well-known pattern according to which all
governments prefer some increase in integration but disagree about the extent of
integration: Gerald Schneider and Lars-Erik Cederman, 'The Change of Tide in
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In its Final Communiqué of The Hague Summit on 2 December of
that year, the Heads of State and Government, then not yet known as the
European Council, stated their agreement ‘within the Council, on the
basis of the memorandum presented by the Commission on 12 February
1969, and in close collaboration with the Commission, a plan in stages
should be worked out during 1970 with a view to the creation of an
economic and monetary union.’ They also stated that the 'development of
monetary co-operation should be backed up by the harmonisation of
economic policies’.46 It was thus in 1969 that the target of a complete
EMU was adopted for the first time. This was 'a political decision at the
highest level, and it was directly linked to the first enlargement of the
Community and the further deepening of integration.47
While agreeing on the principle of monetary unification, the six
Member States disagreed however regarding the means. The basic split,
already evidenced, was between monetarists and economists. In
retrospect it is worth noting that both the economists and many if not
most of the monetarists favoured a transfer of fiscal and hence political
powers to the centre, though they differed in the strength of their
preferences and in their view of the timing.48 The basic conflict that
emerged thus had two main dimensions: first, whether economic
convergence should precede or result from monetary convergence; and,
second, whether concomitantly a supranational organ should be created
or not. On the whole, the monetarists said no to both questions, while the
economists answered both in the affirmative.49
                                                                                                                                                                
Political Cooperation: A Limited Information Model of European Integration', (1994) 48
International Organization 633-663.
46 European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, European
Atomic Energy Community, Third General Report on the Activities of the Community
1969 (Brussels-Luxembourg, Publishing Services of the European Communities, 1970),
p 50.
47 Loukas Tsoukalis, 'Economic and Monetary Union: The Primacy of High Politics',
in Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union
(Oxford University Press, 3rd  edition 1996), pp 279-299 at p 281.
48 See Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political Economy of Monetary Union', in Peter B.
Kenen (Ed),: Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open
(Princeton University Press, 1995), pp 448-505 at p 475;, who gives as examples of the
latter group Daniel Gros and Niels Thygesen, European Monetary Integration: From
the European Monetary System to European Monetary Union (Longman,1992); and
Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi,  Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, and Francesco Papadia, 'The
Policy History of the Maastricht Treaty: The Transition to the Final Stage of EMU', in
Guillermo de la Dehesa, Alberto Giovannini, Manuel Guitian and Richard Portes
(eds), (Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1993)
49 See Francesco Giavazzi and Alberto Giovannini, Limiting Exchange Rate
Flexbility: The European Monetary System (MIT Press, 1989), p 25; Glenda Goldstone
Rosenthal, The Men Behind the Decisions (Lexington Books, 1975), pp 102-112. The
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Specific normative results followed. In January 1970 the Council
passed a resolution in favour of establishing an economic and monetary
union in the Community.50 The following month, at the quarterly
meeting of finance ministers, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg
submitted 'fairly detailed plans' for EMU, though the meeting made
clear that ‘the major issue was whether to provide monetary support for
member states whose currencies experienced difficulties or whether to
integrate members’ economies so that currency problems would not
arise’.51 At its 6 March 1970 meeting the Council decided to set up a
committee under the chairmanship of Pierre Werner, the Prime
Minister and Finance Minister of Luxembourg, to  draw up a report
'comprising an analysis of the various suggestions and enabling the
fundamental choices to be made for a phased establishment of the
economic and monetary union of the Community’.52
The Werner Committee consisted of six other members in addition
to its chairman: the five chairs of the so-called 'special committees',
namely the Committee of Governors of Central Banks, the Monetary
Committee, the Budget Policy Committee, the Short-Term Economic
Policy Committee, and the Medium-Term Economic Policy Committee,
together with a representative of the Commission.53 It submitted an
interim report in May 1970 and a final report to the Commission and the
Council in October 1970.54 It proposed the achievement of a full-fledged
EMU by the end of the 1970s. This was to include complete liberalisation
of intra-EEC capital movements, irrevocable convertibility of currencies,
irrevocably fixed exchange rates, pooling of monetary reserves, and the
control of monetary policy by a single European institution. It adopted
many of the principles set down in the Commission's March
Memorandum. With regard to a European-level fiscal function, it was
more ambitious than the subsequent Delors Report.55
                                                                                                                                                                
monetarists included France and Belgium, while among the economists were
Germany, the Netherlands and also Italy, at least its then Minister of Finance Emilio
Colombo.
50 Bull EC, I-1970, pp. 11-16.
51 Glenda Goldstone Rosenthal, The Men Behind the Decisions (Lexington Books, 1975),
p 107.
52 ECSC-EEC-EAEC, Secretariat General of the Commission, Bulletin of the European
Communities, No. 5-1970, (Brussels, Publishing Services of the European
Communities, 1970), p 50.
53 See Europe Bulletin, April 21 1969.
54 Rapport au Conseil at à la Commission concernant la réalisation par étapes de
l'union  économique et monétaire dans la Communaute, JO 11.11.197, C 136/1.
55 Compare Council 1970 and Delors Committee 1989. See also Daniel Gros and Niels
Thygesen, European Monetary Integration (Longman,1992), chapter 1.
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These proposals provoked debate and opposition, which was not
surprising given the strong differences of views among Member States
and the international monetary turbulence at the time. Moreover, this
debate took place almost entirely among governments and experts, not
as in the case of the Maastricht Treaty among the broader public, which
was not really informed and remained virtually unaware of the issues at
stake. Among governments, the proposal to create a European
stabilisation fund by the end of the first stage of EMU was opposed
particularly by Germany, which feared that Bundesbank reserves would
be used to support weak currencies, such as (then) the French franc.56 In
the light of this reaction, the Commission softened the supranational
aspects of the proposals and proposed a Council decision on the
strengthening of the coordination of Member States' short-term
economic policies and a draft Council decision on increased cooperation
between the central banks.57 Nevertheless, the basic dichotomy between
two views of EMU and indeed of European integration itself remained as
sharp as before. Indeed, ‘government representatives ... stood by their
national positions until the very last moment. Only when they were able
to work out a formula that left the substantive issues so vague or so
flexible as to be almost meaningless were they able to reach agreement.’
58
These differences informed the Resolution adopted on 9 February
1971 by the Council and the Representatives of the Member States to the
effect that:
‘In order to assure satisfactory growth, full employment and internal
stability of the Community; in order to remedy structural and regional
imbalances in evidence; in order to strengthen the contribution of the
Community to international economic and monetary cooperation and
thus to arrive at a stable and growing Community, the Council and the
representatives of the member states express their political will to
establish over the next ten years an economic and monetary union
according to a plan by stages, beginning January 1, 1971’.59
                                                        
56 Glenda Goldstone Rosenthal, The Men Behind the Decisions (Lexington Books, 1975),
p 108.
57 JO 26.11.1970 C 240/20-26.
58 Glenda Goldstone Rosenthal, The Men Behind the Decisions (Lexington Books, 1975),
p 112.
59 OJ 27.3.1971 C28/1; also in Compendium of Community Monetary Texts (1989), p. 33.
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This Resolution set a series of objectives for the attainment of EMU by
stages. They included the complete and irreversible convertibility of
currencies, the elimination of fluctuation margins, and the
establishment of parity, all seen as prerequisites for a single currency,
together with the creation of a Community organisation of central
banks. Though linking EMU with the completion of the internal market,
the Resolution was without any legal force. This was not however the
primary determinant of its short-run inefficacy, which was mainly due
instead to disagreements among Member States, domestic policy
interests, and the international context.
The summer of 1971 saw the collapse of the fixed exchange rate
system. After some months of floating currencies, the Council and the
representatives of the Member States in March 1972 adopted a further
Resolution,60 which, in addition to marking an agreement to create a
Regional Development Fund, established the European 'currency
snake'. This restricted the fluctuation margins of EEC currencies in
respect of each other to 4.5%, with the central banks agreeing to
intervene in the money market to ensure this objective. It proved
ineffective, however, and the collapse of Bretton Woods led to the collapse
of the European fixed exchange rate system.
‘Fixed exchange rates, with narrow margins of fluctuation, which had
been seen as the most concrete manifestation of the first stage of EMU,
proved incompatible with increasingly divergent economic policies and
inflation rates. Thus, political commitments, taken at the very top and
usually not translated into the appropriate economic policies, finally
gave way under market pressure.’61
But with floating exchange rates after 1973, the 'snake' enforced what
was known as 'bloc floating'.62  In March 1973 the Council decided not to
intervene with regard to the dollar and leave the snake as a joint float.63
In fact, this was a German bloc, in which the Deutschmark served as
                                                        
60 JO 18.4.1972 C38/3; Compendium of Community Monetary Texts (1974), p. 30.
61 Loukas Tsoukalis, 'Economic and Monetary Union: The Primacy of High Politics',
in Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union
(Oxford University Press, 3rd  edition 1996), pp 279-299 at p 282.
62 Klaus Gretschman, 'EMU: Thoughtful Wish or Wishful Thinking', in Klaus
Gretschmann (ed), Economic and Monetary Union: Implications for National Policy-
Makers (European Institute of Public Administration, 1993), pp 3-23 at pp 10-12.
63 Council Statement, 12 March 1973, in Compendium of Community Monetary Texts
(1974) 63. On the snake, see P. Coffey, The European Monetary System: Past, Present
and Future (2nd  ed. 1987).
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anchor for the currencies of smaller EEC countries.64 This, as Tsoukalis
remarks, 'was the first concrete manifestation of the growing
importance of Germany in the Community and Europe more
generally.'65
From the legal standpoint, two further significant developments
occurred prior to the creation of the European Monetary System. The
first, a compromise in the continuing debate between economists and
monetarists, and foreshadowing more contemporary legal
developments, was the enactment in 1974 of the Convergence Decision
and the Stability Directive. Both  measures expressed conceptions of the
prerequisites for further monetary integration, but the former called for
a high degree of economic convergence among Member States, while the
latter was oriented towards achieving the highest possible degree of
stability, full employment and growth. The legal forms in which these
differing views were expressed were symbolic. Not only was a smaller
margin of manoeuvre recognised as belonging to Member States in
respect of economic convergence than in respect of monetary stability
and employment policy, in the last of which Member States retained full
legal powers. In addition, the very choice of these particular legal acts to
encapsulate particular policy desiderata reflected the increasing
German predominance in  matters concerning EMU.66
The second development was the creation in 1975 of the European
Unit of Account (EUA) and its adoption as the accounting unit, first for
European Development Fund and then for the European Investment
Bank and the Community budget. Subsequently, in the framework of the
EMS it was  renamed the European Currency Unit (ECU).  The EUA
was a  basket currency.67 Initially it was seen only as a political symbol
                                                        
64 'The fundamental problem was that there was no independent criterion of value, and
by the time the snake was replaced by the European Monetary System it had in effect
become a small DM zone': John A. Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services
in  the European Community (Clarendon Press, 1994), p:138.
65 Loukas Tsoukalis, 'Economic and Monetary Union: The Primacy of High Politics',
in Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union
(Oxford University Press, 3rd  edition 1996), pp 279-299 at p 282.
66 By 1978 only German, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium and the associated
country of Norway remained in the Deutschmark bloc from the original none members
of the 'snake'. The others had dropped out because, 'due to progressive inflation, they
were unable to keep their currencies within the snake’s margin of fluctuation': (Klaus
Gretschman, 'EMU: Thoughtful Wish or Wishful Thinking', in Klaus Gretschmann
(ed), Economic and Monetary Union: Implications for National Policy-Makers
(European Institute of Public Administration, 1993), pp 3-23 at p 11.
67 As to which, see below regarding the ECU.
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for European integration, but it was to play an important role in bond
markets and as a major exchange reserve in the 1980s.68
In 1979, the European Monetary System (EMS) was established on
the initiative of French President Giscard d’Estaing and  German
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Monetary integration thus was again
meant to play a key role in European integration, though the specific
implications for national governments and banking institutions differed
from country to country and, in the event, the United Kingdom did not
join.69 The EMS was based on a non-legally-binding instrument, the
Resolution of the European Council of 5 December 197870, which lay down
the structure of the EMS. Operating procedures were set down in
another non-legally-binding instrument, an Agreement between the
Central Banks of the Member States of 13 March 1979.71
In addition to its political rather than legal nature, the Council
Resolution on which the EMS was based had another distinctive feature.
Instead of creating a comprehensive set of  obligations which applied to
all Member States, the Resolution left it to each Member State to decide
whether or not to join the EMS.72 As John Usher has stated, 'in a sense it
is an agreement between all the Member States that those who so wish
will be bound by the rules and make use of institutions created under
Community law'.73 Consequently, it can be seen as a forerunner, if not a
precedent, for later forms of differentation within the Community
system, including the Social Protocol under the Maastricht Treaty, the
                                                        
68 For a strong argument about the international reserve role of the ECU, see Ralph J
Mehnert, 'The European Currency Unit and Its Use in Developing Countries to Solve
Foreign Exchange Related Problems: The Case of the People's Republic of China',
(1989) 7 International Tax and Business Lawyer 301-352.
69 Loukas Tsoukalis, 'Economic and Monetary Union: The Primacy of High Politics',
in Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union
(Oxford University Press, 3rd  edition 1996), pp 279-299 at p 283.
70 EC Bulletin 1978 No. 12 point 1.1.11. John A. Usher, The Law of Money and Financial
Services in the European Community (Clarendon Press, 1994), pp 139-142 states that any
doubts about the legal basis of the EMS were largely resolved by the insertion of Article
102A EC by means of the Single European Act, the judgement  of the European Court of
Justice in Opinion 1/91, Opinion delivered pursuant to the Second subparagraph of
Article 208(1) of the Treaty. Draft Agreement between the Community on the one hand
and the countries of EFTA on the other, relating to the creation of European Economic
Area, 1991 ECR I-6079 to the effect that EMU was a Community objective even before the
TEU; and also by the  express reference to the EMS in Art. 109J EC regarding the
convergence criteria.
71 A revised version may be found in Compendium of Community Monetary Texts
(1989), at 50.
72 See art. 3 of the 1978 Resolution.
73 John A. Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in  the European
Community (Clarendon Press, 1994),  p 141.
© 1998 Francis Snyder
21
special treatment of the United Kingdom and Denmark in respect of
monetary policy, and enhanced cooperation under the Amsterdam
Treaty.74
The EMS centred on the ECU (the renamed European unit of
account). The ECU was a basket currency, consisting of fixed amounts of
each EC currency.75 Each EC currency had a central rate defined in
terms of the ECU. The central rates were used to establish a grid of
bilateral exchange rates, with 2.25 per cent margin fluctuations around
those bilateral rates, except for the Italian lira and the Irish punt which
began with fluctuation margins of 6 per cent and for the pound sterling
which initially stayed out of the EMS. Central bank interventions were
compulsory and unlimited when currencies reached their permitted
margins of fluctuation. Central rates could be changed by common
consent. Provision was made for large credit facilities to permit
intervention in EC currencies.76
The EMS also included a divergence indicator, which was meant
to guarantee a certain symmetry in the burden of adjustment between
strong and weak currencies. 'In simple words, the introduction of the
divergence indicator implied that average behaviour should constitute
good behaviour, although this did not square well with another implicit
feature of the EMS agreement, namely a more general alignment to
German’s anti-inflation strategy. The contradiction was soon to become
apparent, and the result was that the divergence indicator was never put
into effect.’ 77 Nevertheless, a September 1987 agreement provided for the
increased use of intramarginal intervention.78
With seven realignments between 1979 and spring 1983, the EMS
gradually established the practice that realignments were to be common
rather than unilateral decisions. The Basle-Nyborg Agreement of
                                                        
74 See Usher, ibid .; and Tuytschaever, draft PhD thesis, chapter 2?.
75 The first ECU bond was issued in 1981 by the Italian telecommunications company,
Stet.
76 This summary is based on Loukas Tsoukalis, 'Economic and Monetary Union: The
Primacy of High Politics', in Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy-
Making in the European Union (Oxford University Press, 3rd  edition 1996), pp 279-299 at
p 283.
77 Loukas Tsoukalis, 'Economic and Monetary Union: The Primacy of High Politics',
in Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union
(Oxford University Press, 3rd  edition 1996), pp 279-299 at p283.
78 See John A. Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in  the European
Community (Clarendon Press, 1994),  p 144, citing EC Bulletin 1987 No. 9 point 1.3.5.
As to medium-term financial assistance within the EMS, see Usher, ibid ., 1994 at 145-
146.
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September 1987 consecrated an agreement of the Central Bank
Governors, as approved by an informal meeting of Ecofin, regarding
movements within the band, management of interest-rate differentials,
and intervention as instruments to be used, in that order, to guard
against monetary instability. Between 1987 and 1992 there was a strong
preference against realignments, as participants sought to maintain
their ERM parities against the Deutschemark. To the extent that this
restricted the use of  interest rates as an instrument of independent
monetary polity, the discretion of ERM participants thus was increasing
limited.79
This discretion was strongly restricted also by the adoption by the
Council in mid-1988 of the Third Capital Directive.80 It required Member
States to abolish restrictions on movement of capital between persons
resident in Member States.81 Where short-term  capital movements of
exceptional magnitude imposed severe strains on foreign-exchange
markets and led to serious disturbances in the conduct of monetary and
exchange rate policies, however, the Commission, after consulting the
Monetary Committee and the Committee of Governors of the Central
Banks, could authorise a Member State to take protective measures in
respect of certain listed capital movements.82 In cases of urgency, the
Member State concerned was entitled to take any necessary protective
measures, subject to informing other Member States and the
Commission. After consulting the Monetary Committee and the
Committee of Governors, the Commission was to decide whether the
Member State could continue to apply the measures or should abolish
them.83
Taken together, ERM and the Third Capital Directive resulted in a
very substantial reduction of national governments' room for manoeuvre
in matters of monetary policy. This can be illuminated by referring to
                                                        
79 This paragraph is based primarily on Klaus Gretschman, 'EMU: Thoughtful Wish
or Wishful Thinking', in Klaus Gretschmann (ed), Economic and Monetary Union:
Implications for National Policy-Makers (European Institute of Public
Administration, 1993), pp 3-23 at pp 11-12; and Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political
Economy of Monetary Union', in Peter B. Kenen (Ed),: Understanding
Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open (Princeton University Press, 1995),
at 458.
80 Council Directive 88/361, OJ 8.7.88 L178/5.
81 Ibid., art. 1(1), which also provided for the classification of capital movements in
accordance with the nomenclature in Annex I..
82 Ibid., art. 3(1), which also provided that the listed capital movements were those in
Annex II..
83 Ibid., art. 3(2).
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what economists often call the 'impossibility theorem', the 'impossible
trilogy' or the 'unholy trinity'. This holds that
'the following three things are in principle incompatible: fixed exchange
rates among a set of national currencies; independent monetary policies
in the countries concerned; and full mobility of capital between one and
another of the countries. ... Eventually one of the three things will have
to give way - the exchange rate, the difference in policy, or the freedom of
capital movements.'84
By the Third Capital Directive, the EC Member States (with limited
exceptions) lost control over capital movements. By tying their interest
rates to that of the Bundesbank, the participants in ERM in effect lost
control of exchange rate policy. In fact, as Goodhart points out, 'It is
arguable that, having accepted ERM membership in this context,
governments had already abandoned discretionary monetary policy '.85
As will be seen later, EMU will remove national governments' control
over exchange rates and further constrict their control over interest
rates, though the latter is a process which in practice has already
largely occurred.86
In January 1988 Edouard Balladur, then French Finance
Minister, proposed the creation of a single currency and a European
Central Bank to control EC monetary policy.  Similar proposals were
made in February 1988 by the Italian Treasury Minister, Giuliano
Amato,, who gave rather more emphasis to the deflationary bias of the
EMS.87 These events were informed by the 1985 Commission White Paper
                                                        
84 John Grahl and Paul Teague, 1992 - The Big Market: The Future of the European
Community (Lawrence and Wishart, 1990) ('impossibility theorem'), p 129; see also
Paul Riché and Charles Wyplosz,(Editions du Seuil, 1993), p  34 ('impossible trilogy');
Benjamen J. Cohen, 'Phoenix Risen: The Resurrection of Global Finance', (1996) 48
World Politics 268-296 at p 280, and Benjamin J. Cohen, 'The Triad the the Unholy
Trinity: Lessons for the Pacific Region', in Richard Higgott, Richard Leaver and John
Ravenhill (eds), Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict?
(Lynne Reinner, 1993) ('unholy trinity'). See also the 'inconsistent quartet', including
free trade: Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, 'The European Monetary System: A Long-Term
View', in Francesco Giaavaszzi, Stefano Micossi, and Marcus Miller (eds), The
European Monetary System (Cambridge University Press, 1988).
85 Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political Economy of Monetary Union', in Peter B.
Kenen (Ed),: Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open
(Princeton University Press, 1995), at 458 
86 'The Emu core group already has virtually fixed interest rates and virtually
identical interest rates. For them, EMU has already started': Wolfgang Munchau,
'Big straide towards EMU', Financial Times , Weekend 11-12 October 1997, p 6.
87 See Horst Ungerer, A Concise History of European Monetary Integration: From EPU
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on completing the internal market by 1992,  including financial
markets.88
Such developments also drew legal inspiration from the newly
introduced Article 102A EC stemming from the 1986 Single European
Act. Article 102a EC was the sole article in a new Treaty Chapter entitled
Cooperation in Economic and Monetary Policy (Economic and Monetary
Union).89 It provided that Member States were to cooperate in order to
ensure the convergence of economic and monetary policies necessary for
the further development of the Community, taking account of the
experience with the EMS and with the ECU.90 It also stated that an
amendment of the Treaty would be required if further development in
the field of economic and monetary policy necessitated institutional
changes, in which case the Monetary Committee and the Committee of
Governors of the Central Banks should also be consulted as regards
monetary policy.91
In June 1988 the European Council met in Hanover to discuss
proposals for establishing monetary union. It agreed to the creation of a
committee to study and propose concrete stages leading towards
monetary union. Chaired by Jacques Delors, then President of the
Commission, the committee consisted also of another member of the
Commission (Frans Andriessen), the twelve Governors of the national
central banks and three personalities designated by common accord by
the Heads of State or Government. This last group included Niels
Thygesen, Professor of Economics in Copenhagen; Alexandre
Lamfalussy, then General Manager of the Bank for International
Settlements in Basle and Professor of Monetary Economics at the
Catholic University of Louvain-la-Neuve; and Miguel Boyer, President of
                                                                                                                                                                
to EMU (Quorum Books, Westport and London, 1997),  pp 191-192.
88 Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market: White
Paper from the Commission to the European Council (Office of the Official Publications
of the EC, 1985). As to the relationship between monetary integration and the internal
market, see Heidemarie Sherman, Richard Brown, Pierre Jacquet, and DeAnne Julius
(eds), Monetary Implications of the 1992 Process (Pinter Publishers, London, 1990).
Already the previous year Belgium had issued the first legal-tender ECU coin, minted
to celebrate the Community's 30th anniversary.
89 As inserted in Title II of Part Three of the Treaty by Article 20 SEA.
90 Art. 102a (1) EC, as inserted by the SEA.
91 Art. 102a(2) EC, as inserted by the SEA. As to the subsequent interpretation of this
Article, in particular regarding the establishment of a European Reserve Fund, see
Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union (The Delors Committee),
Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the Community (1989), pp32-33
(paragraphs 53-54); see also John A. Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services
in  the European Community (Clarendon Press, 1994),  pp 148-149.
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the Banco Exterior de Espana.92  Delors chose two rapporteurs: Gunter
Baer, a high official in the Bundesbank, and Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa
from the Banca d’Italia, and previously rapporteur of the so-called
Padoa-Schioppa Report.93
The Delors Committee Report, presented in 1989, was of
fundamental importance in determining much but not all of the shape of
EMU. It envisaged EMU as a process consisting of three stages,
involving closer coordination of economic and monetary policies of EC
Member States, the establishment of European Central Bank, and the
replacement of national currencies by single European currency.94 As its
proposals regarding monetary policy are so well-known, and in any
event will be dealt with later in so far as they were incorporated into the
Maastricht Treaty, the following paragraphs focus on certain aspects of
the Delors Report which raise issues that proved subsequently to be
extremely controversial.
First, with regard to relations between the EC and the Member
States, the Delors Report did not articulate the argument that EMU
required or would inevitably entail political union. It did however assert
the need for a transfer of decision-making power from the Member
States to the Community, primarily in the fields of monetary policy and
macroeconomic management. This would entail a single decision-
making body in respect of monetary policy and an agreed
macroeconomic framework and legally binding procedures and rules in
respect of economic policy. Though the two policy areas constituted a
single whole, an essential element in defining how they were to be
managed was to be the principle of subsidiarity.95 Nevertheless, in
respect of international monetary cooperation the Delors Report foresaw
that 'the Community would assume its full role ..., and a new form of
representation in arrangements for international policy coordination
and in international monetary negotiations would be adopted'.96
                                                        
92 Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union (The Delors Committee),
Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the Community (1989), Annex I, p 39.
93 Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (ed), Efficiency, stability, equity: a strategy for the
evolution of the Economic System of the European Communties (Commission of the
European Communties, 1987).
94 Among many sources, see Louis, 'A Monetary Union for Tomorrow?', )1989) . . .
Common Market Law Review 301; F. Snyder, 'EMU - Metaphor for European Union?
Institutions, Rules and Types of Regulation', in R. Dehousse (ed)., Europe after
Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union? (Law Books in Europe, 1994).
95 Ibid., p 14 (paragraph 19).
96 Ibid.,  pp 35-36 (paragraph 59).
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Second, with regard to what the Committee regarded as a lesson
of 'historical experience', namely that 'in the absence of countervailing
policies, the overall impact on peripheral regions could be negative',97 the
Delors Report emphasised the necessity of macro-economic policy, and
in particular of setting an EC-wide fiscal policy. This would be necessary
in order to compensate Member States for the loss as a result of EMU of
two major monetary policy instruments, namely control of exchange
rates and the power to run a budgetary deficit. The Report regarded
Community structural and regional polices as necessary to promote
balanced development, narrow regional and structural disparities, and
avoid serious economic and political risks.98 It also considered wage
flexibility and labour mobility as necessary elements in eliminating
differences in competitiveness between different regions and countries.99
In addition, however, it foresaw that
'it might be necessary in certain circumstances to provide financing
flows through official channels. Such financial support would be
additional to what might come from spontaneous capital flows or official
borrowing and should be granted on terms and conditions that would
prompt the recipient to intensity its adjustment efforts.100
Nevertheless, given the small size of the Community budget, any
Community-led fiscal policy would have to be achieved, according to the
Committee, by means of the coordination of national budgetary
policies.101
Each of these strands in the Delors Report had previously been
controversial, was so at the time of the Report, and indeed in the
Committee, and has remained so ever since. For example, Winkler cites
a Bundesbank board member who called political union ‘a conditio sine
qua non' for a successful single currency and regretted that the original
German position ‘no monetary union without political union’ was
dropped at Maastricht.102 More generally, it has often been argued that
                                                        
97 Ibid., p 18 (paragraph 29).
98 Ibid., p 18 (paragraph 29).
99 Ibid., p 19 (paragraph 29). The emphasis on countering shocks by adjusting real
labour costs and by budgetary policies at national and EC level was subsequently
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Economy 11.
100 Ibid., p 19 (paragraph 29).
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the historical experience of currency unions demonstrates that a
centralised monetary policy requires strong central political
institutions.103  Similarly, while the Delors Report echoed the Werner
Report in its emphasis on the need for a common fiscal policy,104 the
Bundesbank President Karl-Otto Pohl played, together with Jacques
Delors, a central role in the Delors Committee.105 This ensured not only
that the Bundesbank served as the model for the future European
Central Bank, but also led to a substantial dilution of  Delors' concern for
a stronger fiscal policy.106 This had a precedent: a 1977 Commission
report on public finances concluded that 'if only because the Community
budget is so relatively very small... in present circumstances monetary
union is impracticable.’107
On the basis of the Delors Report, the European Council meeting
in Madrid in June 1989 decided that the first stage of EMU would start
on 1 July 1990.108 A subsequent Council Decision established a system of
multilateral surveillance of economic developments and policies.109
Another Council Decision amended the structure and functions of the
Committee of Governors of the Central Banks.110
                                                                                                                                                                
University Institute, working paper RSC No. 95/18, 1995), p 11, n 24, referring to R.
Jochimsen, 'Perspectiven der Europäischen Wirtschafts - und Währungsunion' in
Deutsche Bundesbank: Auszüge aus Presse-Artikleln , No. 26, 3-9.
103 See e.g. B. Winkler, Towards a Strategic View on EMU: A Critical Survey
(European University Institute, working paper RSC No. 95/18, 1995), p 11.
104 Compare the Delors Report, paragraph 29, with the  Werner Report, paragraphs 13 and
14.
105 On Pohl's influence in the Delors Committee, see Kenneth Dyson, Elusive Union:
The Process of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe  (Longman, 1994), pp 129 et
seq.: Amy Verdun, The Role of the Delors Committee in the Creation  of the EMU: An
Epistemic Community? (Research Colloquim Series: European Integration and
International Relations Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute,
February 12, 1997) , p 22.
106 As to the Delors Committee rejection of a mechanism for fiscal transfers, see Gros
and Thygesen (a member of the Delors Committee), European Monetary Integration:
From the European Monetary System to European Monetary Union (Longman, 1992), p
480.
107 Commission of the European Communities, Report on the Role of Public Finance in
European Integration (reference number II/10/77 E) (the MacDougall Report), p  12.
108  See Council Decision 90/41 on the progressive convergence of economic policies and
performance during stage one of economic and monetary union, recital 5, OJ 24.3.1990,  
1990 L78/23:
109 Council Decision 90/41 on the progressive convergence of economic policies and
performance during stage one of economic and monetary union, OJ 24.3.1990 L78/23.
This replaced Council Decision 74/120  on the attainment of high degree of convergence
of the economic policies of the Member States of the EEC, OJ 3.5.1974 L63/16.
110 Council Decision 90/142 OJ 24.3.1990 L78/25.
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The recommendations of the Delors Committee formed the basis
for the EMU provisions of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union.111
In particular, Article 3a(2) EC provided that the activities of the Member
States and the Community shall include:
the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates leading to the introduction of a
single currency, the ECU, and the definition and conduct of a single
monetary policy and exchange rate policy the primary objective of both of
which shall be to maintain price stability and, without prejudice to this
objective, to support the general economic polices in the Community, in
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free
competition.112
These activities were to comply with the principles of stable prices,
sound public finances and monetary conditions, and a sustainable
balance of payments.113
The principal exceptions to this generalisation regarding the
proximate origins of the EMU provisions of the TEU were two-fold. First,
the criteria according to which the convergence of Member States'
economies was to be assessed were 'merely hinted at' in the Delors
Report,114 negotiated during the pre-Maastricht Intergovernmental
Conference, notably in the Monetary Committee, and agreed in the final
                                                        
111 The main provisions are contained in Articles 2, 3a(2), 4a, and a new Title VII
Economic and Monetary Policy including Arts. 102a-109m, supplemented by the
Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European
Central Bank, the Protocol on the Statute of the European Monetary Institute, the
Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, the Protocol on the Convergence Criteria
referred to in Article 109j EC, the Protocol on the Transition to the Third Stage of
Economic and Monetary Union, the Protocol on Certain Provisions relating to the UK,
and the Protocol on Certain Provisions relating to Denmark. For surveys of these
provisions, see  F. Dehousse, ' 'L'Union économique et monétaire', Le Traité de
Maastricht 1, C.E.E.I./Centre F. Dehousse, Université de Liège (1992); Goebel,
'European Economic and Monetary Union: Will the EMU Ever Fly?' , (1998) 4
Columbia Journal of European Law  249; Louis, L'Union économique et monétaire',
(1992) Cahiers de Droit Européen 251 Pipkorn, ‘Legal Arrangements in the Treaty of
Maastricht for the Effectiveness of the EMU’, (1994) 31 Common Market Law Review
263-291; Slot, ‘The Institutional Provisions of the EMU’, in D Curtin and T Henkels
(eds), Institutional Dynamics of European Integration, vol.  II, pp 229-249 (Nijhoff
1994); Snyder, EMU - Metaphor for European Union? Institutions, Rules and Types of
Regulation', in R. Dehousse (ed), Europe after Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union?
(Law Books in Europe, 1994), pp 63-99.
112 Art. 3a(2) EC.
113 Art. 3a(3) EC.
114  Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, Report on Economic and
Monetary Union in the European Community (Office for Official Publications of the
European Community, 1989), p. 23 (paragraph 30).
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hours at Maastricht.115 Second, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty,
notably litigation in Germany and the 1992 referenda in Denmark and
France, stimulated a long-overdue widespread political debate about the
objectives and means of European integration, which focused in
particular on EMU. In addition to clarifying different, competing
conceptions of European integration,116 it contributed to the legal
framework of EMU the so-called 'Denmark Agreement'. This was a
unique instrument in the history of European law, which expressed the
position of Denmark in respect of EMU.117
The Maastricht Treaty, which as regards EMU was not modified
at all by the Amsterdam Treaty, provides for both economic policy and
monetary policy. For these purposes, economic policy comprises price
stability, control of excessive budget deficits, and certain common
policies. Monetary policy includes a single currency, a central bank, and
a single monetary policy body.118 The TEU consecrated the economists'
coronation theory of monetary union, according to which economic
convergence is a precondition for monetary integration. Nevertheless,
the TEU gives monetary policy a much more supranational cast, while
the provisions regarding economic policy accord more weight to national
governments. However illogical this may appear from the theoretical
standpoint, it reflects another political compromise,
                                                        
115 See  Kenneth Dyson, Elusive Union: The Process of Economic and Monetary
Integration in Europe  (Longman, 1994), pp 146-159; Amy Verdun, 'The Role of the
Delors Committee in the Creation  of the EMU: An Epistemic Community?' (Research
Colloquim Series: European Integration and International Relations Robert Schuman
Centre, European University Institute, February 12, 1997)  p. 24.
116 Manfred Brunner and Others v The European Union (Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2158/92
(before the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2. Senat) (Federal Constitutional Court, 2nd
Chamber) [1994] 1  CMLR 57.
117 Denmark and the Treaty of the European Union, Edinburgh European Council, 11
and 12 December 1992, Conclusions of the Presidency, OJ 31.12.1992 C348/1. See also D.
Horwath 'The Compromise on Denmark and the Treaty on European Union: A Legal
and Political Analysis' (1994) 31 Common Market Law Review, pp 765-805. With
regard to the position of the UK, Usher has argued that exclusion from Art. 3a(2) EC
'does not necessary mean exclusion from the objective of economic and monetary
union’: see John A. Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in the European
Community (Clarendon Press, 1994),  pp 150-151..
118 As Dunnett points out, not all the criteria set forth by F.A. Mann, The Legal Aspect of
Money, 5th edition 1992 at 508 for a monetary union are fulfilled, in that ‘the central
bank will not necessarily be a lender of last resort; national central banks will retain
certain reserve assets; external liabilities will not be pooled; and the volume of
domestic money may be affected by the exercise of external monetary powers retained
by the Council and the Member States’ : D.R.R. Dunnett 'Legal and Institutional Issues
affecting Economic and Monetary Union in David O'Keeffe and Patrick Twomey
(eds) Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (Chancery Law Publishing,  1994), pp. 138-
139
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1992 also saw, however, the virtual collapse of the EMS.  On the
'Black Monday' of 16 September, market pressures led to the withdrawal
of sterling, the suspension of the lira and the devaluation of the peseta.
Until then there had been no realignments in the EMS since 1987. Such
stability had been based on the convergence of inflation rates by means of
monetary policy, with the Bundesbank basically in charge. It relied
mainly on close cooperation among central banks within informal
networks rather than on EC committees and other institutions. In
respect of budgetary policies, however, there was little real convergence,
and what existed stemmed from autonomous national decisions rather
than EC-level coordination. Overall, EMS remained principally a
creature of central bankers: exchange rates were the basic instrument
for fighting inflation, and politicians intervened to renegotiate them
mainly in times of crisis.119 Yet the ERM crises demonstrated  that fixed-
but-adjustable exchange rates could be extremely unstable in
circumstances of the free movement of capital and the existence of large
capital markets, leading economists to conclude that the only
alternatives were either floating or fixed exchange rates.120
The idea that monetary policy was apolitical thus proved an early
victim of the controversial process of ratifying the Maastricht Treaty.
The road to monetary union was suddenly filled with debate about the
aims of monetary policy, the relation between monetary policy and
economic policy, the entitlement of citizens and their elected
representatives rather than technical experts to decide, and indeed
whether or not EMU really should be a central objective of European
integration and if so, on whose terms. This debate contributed perhaps
more than any other single factor in the history of European integration
to the politicisation of the EU and also of European Union, particularly
European Community, law. It has also led to changes, often in
appearance and sometimes in reality, in how basic decisions regarding
European monetary integration are taken, who participates, and with
what ultimate ends in view.
                                                        
119 See Loukas Tsoukalis, 'Economic and Monetary Union', in H. Wallace and W.
Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union (Oxford, 3rd  ed. 1996) 279-299, p
284.
120  Giorgia Giovannetti and Ramon Marimon , 'A Monetary Union for a
Heterogeneous Europe', (European University Institute, Working Paper, RSC No.
95/17, 1995),  9. A short form of this article has been published in Torres (ed), Monetary
Reform in Europe (Universidade Catolica Editoria, Lisbon, 1996).
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2. POLITICAL MONEY
Jacques Rueff   was only partly correct when (and if) he stated that
'l'Europe se fera par la monnaie ou elle ne se fera pas'.121 He neglected to
add that money is politics. Had he done so, he might also have observed
that 'l'Europe se fera par la politique, ou elle ne se fera pas'. At least
with regard to EMU, one thus may assert that the last word about EMU
belongs to the political class and those segments of the broader public
which in one way or another participate in politics. But not completely
....
In order to elaborate this point, it is useful to consider briefly
certain theoretical explanations of the evolution of the legal framework
of EMU. The main points to be made here can be put in form of four
statements. First, how one explains the evolution of EMU depends on
one's theory of European integration and general theoretical framework.
Second, EMU is primarily a political project, despite its fundamental
economic importance and its significant legal characteristics. Third,
EMU has been characterised, more than any other EU  policy to date by
the uneven, indeed asymmetric interaction of a technical discourse and
a political discourse. Fourth, the evolution of EMU can in my view be
explained adequately by combining a theory of two-level games with the
notion of an epistemic community.
First, explanations of how EMU evolved are a function of one's
theory of European integration and general theoretical assumptions.
Two recent syntheses of a growing literature may illustrate the point.
Wolf and Zangl distinguish three positions: supranationalism,
intergovernmentalism and neoinstitutionalism.122 Supranationalists
view Maastricht Treaty EMU as the result of a coalition between the
Commission and the central banks of MS interested in EMU.
Intergovernmentalists emphasise the convergence of interests among
Germany, the United Kingdom and France. Neoinstitutionalists stress
                                                        
121 The phrase is attributed to him by Daniel Gros and Niels Thygesen, European
Monetary Integration: From the European Monetary System to European Monetary
Union (Longman,1992); p 3.
122 Dieter Wolf and Bernhard Zangl, 'The European Economic and Monetary Union:
'Two-level Games' and the Formation of International Institutions', (1996) 2 European
Journal of International Relations 355-393 at pp 356-357  As examples of each position,
they refer to David R. Cameron, 'Transnational Relations and the Development of
European Economic and Monetary Union', in Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed), Bringing
Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and
International Institutions (Cambridge University Press, 1995), Wayne Sandholtz
'Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht', (1993) 47 International
Organization : 1-39 and their own work, respectively.
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multi-level games, involving interests on the national, supranational
and transnational levels.
Another useful survey of explanations of EMU is presented by
Verdun, who gives  some of these as well as other examples.123 On one
view, EMU was possible in the late 1980s because of a combination of
factors, including domestic support for monetary and price stability, the
need for a regime of monetary stability, Euro-optimism, the German
need to demonstrate its commitment to European integration, the wish
of other countries (France, Italy, Benelux) that shadowed German
monetary policies to have a greater voice in EC monetary policy, and
finally the desire of certain Member States (e.g. Italy) to institutionalise
their commitment to low inflation, notably for domestic political reasons.
Another view stresses intergovernmental bargaining.124 Others
emphasise the combination of interstate bargaining, issue linkage, and
domestic distributional factors;125 the linkage in the IGC between issues
such as EMU, the cohesion fund, the social chapter, an extension of the
powers of the European Parliament;126 international circumstances;127
the relationship between domestic politics and EC institutional
structure;128 the role of ideas;129 and the role of  experts, in particular
central bankers, operating in transnational networks such as
committees.130 These various explanations of EMU reflect different
                                                        
123 Amy Verdun, 'The Role of the Delors Committee in the Creation of EMU: An
Epistemic Community?', presented at the Research Colloquium Series 'European
Integration and International Relations', Robert Schuman Centre, European
University Institute, Florence, 12 February 1997, pp 7-14, on which this paragraph is
based. I use Verdun's characterisation of different explanations and authors.
124 See Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power in  the European Community: A Liberal
Intergovernmentalist Approach' (1993) 31 Journal of Common Market Studies 473;
1993.
125 Barry Eichengreen and John Frieden,The Political Economy of European Monetary
Unification (Westview Press, 1995).
126 Lisa Martin,'International and Domestic Institutions in the EMU Process',  (1993)
5(2) Economics and Politics, 125-144.
127 Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Politics of Maastricht' (1993) 5(2) Economics and Politics , pp
105-123.
128 Helen Milner, 'Regional Economic Cooperation, Global Markets and Domestic
Politics: A Comparison of NAFTA and the Maastricht Treaty, (1995) 2(3) Journal of
European Public Policy: 337-360.
129 See Kenneth Dyson, Elusive Union: The Process of Economic and Monetary Union
in Europe  (Longman, 1994), p 16, who stresses the  ‘control over the key ideas and
beliefs informing the policy process, in particular the ‘capture’ of the EMS policy
process by economic ideas of ‘sound money’ and the prevalence of political beliefs about
European union’.
130 David R. Cameron, 'Transnational Relations and the Development of European
Economic and Monetary Union', in Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed), Bringing
Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and
International Institutions (Cambridge University Press, 1995); Amy Verdun, 'The
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conceptions of European integration and form part of different
theoretical frameworks.
Second, despite its economic, social and legal significance, EMU
is primarily a political project. Two highly reputed economists have
stated, reflecting a widely held view, that  ‘neither economic theory nor
economic evidence provides a clear case for or against monetary
integration....The absence of a clear economic justification for EMU
leads us to conclude that events in Europe are being driven mainly by
political factors’.131  Another distinguished economist concludes that '‘It
is probable that those favouring monetary unification within the
European Community (EC) are also motivated mainly by political
considerations, although the change in  the monetary constitution, set
out in the Maastricht Treaty, has been discussed largely in economic
terms’.132  Indeed one of the principal authors of the 1989 Delors Report
stated that in the long run EMU was not feasible without political
union.133 In 1996 French President Jacques Chirac was reported to have
stated that 'behind the single currency was the entire political project
that France and Germany have together for Europe and which was at
stake'.134  Tsoukalis concludes that ‘The history of European monetary
                                                                                                                                                                
Role of the Delors Committee in the Creation  of the EMU: An Epistemic Community?'
(Research Colloquim Series: European Integration and International Relations Robert
Schuman Centre, European University Institute, February 12, 1997). See also Glenda
Goldstone Rosenthal, The Men Behind the Decisions: Cases in European Policy-
Making (Lexington Books, 1975). I wish to emphasise that the work by Dyson is much
richer than such a simple characterisation might lead one to be believe. Both Kenneth
Dyson, Elusive Union: The Process of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe
(Longman, 1994). In my view Kenneth Dyson, Elusive Union: The Process of
Economic and Monetary Union in Europe  (Longman, 1994) is among the best  books
written so far about EMU.
131 Barry Eichengreen and John Frieden,The Political Economy of European Monetary
Unification (Westview Press, 1995), p 89.
132 Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political Economy of Monetary Union', in Peter B.
Kenen (Ed),: Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open
(Princeton University Press, 1995), at 448. See also Fratianni and Waller, The
Mastricht Way to EMU (Princeton University, International Finance Section, June
1992, Princeton Essays in International Finance, No. 187), pp 1-2, who state: ‘Although
there are surely economic benefits to be expected from a monetary union, the main
driving force for its (EMU’s) resurgence remains the quest for political integration in
Europe'.
133 K.O. Pohl 'The Further Development of the European Monetary System (September
1988)' in Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, Collection of
Papers submitted to the Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union
(Office for Official Publication of the European Community, 1989), p 136. See also
Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political Economy of Monetary Union', in Peter B. Kenen
(Ed),: Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open (Princeton
University Press, 1995), p 455.
134 Agence Europe, No 6801 (n.s.), Saturday 1 September' 1996 p 5 (the verbatim quotation
is from Agence Europe). The same issue of Agence Europe also reported that, on the
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integration can be seen ... as a dialectical process between wider political
objectives and market realities’.135 Put another way, 'politics ... has been
the decisive ingredient in the European process from the outset' and
that 'there is no such a thing as unpolitical money'.136
Clearly the single currency has crucial actual and symbolic
implications for national governments and for the building of a potential
supranational polity and constitutional culture.137 For example, adopting
a single currency ‘could refocus the attention to gainers and losers on
the status of the agent involved, rather than his or her country of
residence’.138 The single currency may create and emphasise new types
of identity, or rather old types within a new political context, namely
class and other forms of social and economic differentiation, rather than
nationality. It would thus be likely to create and strengthen ties between
people in different EC Member States. This in turn could have a decisive
impact on the functioning of governance in the context of European
integration, including fiscal policy but extending also to constitutional
principles, the development of constitutionalising processes and the
growth of constitutional culture.
If, borrowing from the late Deng Xiaoping, we can characterise
the evolution of EMU as the search for 'capitalism with European
                                                                                                                                                                
same day, during a ceremony in honour of the 65th birthday of the President of the
Bundesbank, German Federal Chancellor Kohl indicated 'that the single currency
will have to be introduced, but not on the basis of a weak compromise', while
Bundesbank President Tietmeyer indicated that he 'wholeheartedly supported
monetary integration but that its foundations should be sound ones'.
135 Loukas Tsoukalis, 'Economic and Monetary Union', in H. Wallace and W .
Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union (Oxford, 3rd  ed. 1996) 279-299, p
280.
136 Klaus Gretschmann, Hans-Helmut Kotz and Olaf Sleijpen, ‘The European
Monetary System: The Geography of Economics versus the Politics of Money?’, in K.
Gretschmann (ed), Economic and Monetary Union: Implications for National Policy-
Makers (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff for the European Institute of Public
Administration, 1993), pp 27-49 at p 28.
137 See also Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political Economy of Monetary Union', in
Peter B. Kenen (Ed),: Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the
Open (Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 455. See also Stephen Clarkson, 'Perché
No? Qualms about Currency Union from over the Sea' (Paper presented at the
Workshop The Political and Institutional Deficits of the European Integration Process,
European University Institute, 30-31 May 1997), p 18, who asserts that '‘The elites
driving EMU to fruition seen to want a common currency less for economic reasons
than to pursue a triple political agenda: neo-liberal restraint of the welfare state, the
consolidation of European power in its global context, and the joint agenda of the
Franco-German axis.’
138 Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political Economy of Monetary Union', in Peter B.
Kenen (Ed),: Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open
(Princeton University Press, 1995, p 475.
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characteristics', one conclusion emerges. This is that we need to
evaluate EMU not merely in economic terms but also in political terms.
EMU has never been simply a technical economic issue and should not
be treated only as such. Consequently, it is essential to be aware of its
potential political implications and to address them directly. This
includes the likely political consequences of EMU and its costs and
benefits, for example with regard to increased political integration,
legitimacy and the creation of social solidarity.
Third, EMU, once assumed to be a goal, has thus far
involved two major decisions.139 The first decision concerns institutional
choices, most notably whether to create a unified monetary policy with a
single currency and common institutions or whether to rely on the
market. The Delors Committee chose the former. This option was
endorsed by the June 1989 European Council in Madrid and expressed in
the Maastricht Treaty. The second decision relates to the strategy for
institutionalisation, in particular whether to use the coronation
strategy, on the one hand, or the 'monetarist' or  'locomotive' strategy,
on the other hand. These alternatives were discussed at the
Intergovernmental Conference in Rome in December 1990, and the
December 1991 European Council meeting in Maastricht chose the
coronation strategy. Both sets of issues have long been part of the
specialist debate regarding European monetary integration  Both have
been resolved, for the time being, by high-level political  decisions, as
expressed in legal form in the Treaty on European Union.
The process of making these decisions been dominated by two
contrasting discourses, which have sometimes intersected but more
often run in parallel.140 The first, a technical discourse, expressed by
banking and financial specialists mainly in expert committees and
networks, appears to have been continuous throughout the history of
debates on European monetary integration. It has been concerned
mainly with economic doctrines, theories and hypotheses, such as ideas
about inflation,  and relations between currency and economic
integration or between monetary policy and fiscal policy, and the
respective merits of the coronation theory and the monetarist theory.  In
this realm, legal issues and legal doctrines have been of little
                                                        
139 For a game-theoretical approach to these issues, see Dieter Wolf and Bernhard
Zangl, 'The European Economic and Monetary Union: 'Two-level Games' and the
Formation of International Institutions', (1996) 2 European Journal of International
Relations.
140 I am indebted to Miguel Poiares Maduro for this point.
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significance, and politics possibly even less. The banker and the
economist have been king.
 In contrast, a second, political discourse, articulated by political
elites and more recently a broader public, has been discontinuous. Its
articulation has varied depending on changes in the pace, nature and
economic context  of European integration. In practice, political
discourse has dominated debates about whether there should be an EMU
at all, while technical discourse has dominated debates about the shape
of EMU .  
When the (discontinuous) political discourse favours the adoption
of EMU, it has tended to borrow from or rely upon the (continuous)
technical discourse for its ideas regarding strategies of
institutionalisation and even, to some extent, regarding institutional
choices. In these circumstances, political discourse has fed on and
reinforced certain strands of the technical discourse. What is striking,
however, is that in the past political discourse has focused almost
entirely on whether there should be an EMU. Only recently has political
discourse begun to address the issue of how EMU should be brought
about.. This reorientation has placed our conceptions of  EMU in a
wholly new perspective. It has opened up a broadly based, highly
salutory, and extremely controversial public debate, not  simply about
the role and governance of monetary policy, but also about the nature
and future of European integration.
Fourth, building on these remarks, we can in my view141 explain
the evolution of EMU, at least provisionally, by combining two
hypotheses to generate a third. The first hypothesis is that  changes in
the configuration of interests lead to a change in normative and
institutional structures. The second hypothesis is that the evolution of
EMU has been characterised by the existence of two discourses, a
relatively continuous technical discourse and a relatively discontinuous
political discourse. By combining these hypotheses, we can generate a
third hypothesis. This is that EMU is the result of the coincidence of
political and technical interests. Since the 1960s the basic interests
expressed in technical discourse have remained remarkably constant,
while those expressed in political discourse have varied.142 EMU is the
                                                        
141 On the basis of the arguments about legal change, in particular the relations between
interests, structures and processes, put forward in Francis Snyder, New Directions in
European Community Law (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1990).
142 For attempts to come to grips with political discourse about EMU, see Glenda
Goldstone Rosenthal, The Men Behind the Decisions  (Lexington Books, 1975), pp 112-
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product of their overlap, or, put another way, the basic motor forces of
EMU are political.
The continuity of technical interests and technical discourse is
captured neatly by the conception of an epistemic community. As defined
by Haas, the concept of 'epistemic community' refers to ‘a network of
professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds...  /who/...
have (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs...; (2) shared
causal beliefs...; (3) shared notions of validity...;and (4) a common policy
enterprise.143 It has been applied, in my view persuasively, to the expert
groups which, since the 1960s, have outlined or formulated policies
regarding EMU. 144
Verdun, for example, argues that such groups as the Monetary
Committee or the Committee of Central Bank Governors have
demonstrated a great continuity, often including continuity of individual
members.145 She further argues that they were dominated by central
bankers and monetary specialists, including academic economists, who
                                                                                                                                                                
118; Carsten Hefeker, Interest Groups and Monetary Integration: The Political
Economy of Exchange Regime Choice (Westview Press, 1997); Amy Verdun, 'An
"Asymmetrical" Economic and Monetary Union in the EU: Perceptions of Monetary
Authorities and Social Partners', (1996) 20 Revue d'Intégration Européenne / Journal
of European Integration 59.81; Bernard Moss (ed), The Single Currency in National
Perspective: The Limits of European Integration (in press); B...Connolly, The Rotten
Heart of Europe (add reference).
143 Haas 1992b /cited in Amy Verdun, The Role of the Delors Committee in the Creation
of the EMU: An Epistemic Community? (Research Colloquim Series: European
Integration and International Relations Robert Schuman Centre, European University
Institute, February 12, 1997), p 3
144 In particular, see Kenneth Dyson, Elusive Union: The Process of Economic and
Monetary Union in Europe  (Longman, 1994); Amy Verdun, 'The Role of the Delors
Committee in the Creation  of the EMU: An Epistemic Community?' (Research
Colloquim Series: European Integration and International Relations Robert Schuman
Centre, European University Institute, February 12, 1997).
145 See Amy Verdun, 'The Role of the Delors Committee in the Creation  of the EMU: An
Epistemic Community?' (Research Colloquim Series: European Integration and
International Relations Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute,
February 12, 1997). See also Kenneth Dyson, Elusive Union: The Process of Economic
and Monetary Union in Europe  (Longman, 1994) and, for the earlier period, Glenda
Goldstone Rosenthal, The Men Behind the Decisions: Cases in European Policy-
Making (Lexington Books, 1975). More recently, the Governor of the Central Bank of
Ireland has stated that 'As well as inheriting the role of the Committee of Governors, the
Council of the EMI is virtually identical in composition to the Committee: Maurice
O'Connell, 'The Maastricht Treaty and Aspects of Monetary Union', (1995) 4 Irish
Journal of  European Law 5-17 Writing of the same institutions, John A. Usher, The
Law of Money and Financial Services in the European Community (Clarendon Press,
1994),  p 164, observes that 'in other words the same people carry on, but under a new
name and with new powers’ .
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shared certain views.146 All members of the Delors Committee, for
example,
 ‘believed that further economic and  monetary integration was
desirable. In addition, they shared four causal beliefs: First, they
believed that inflation was detrimental to growth. Second, stable
exchange rates were necessary to ensure the proper operation of the
Internal Market. Third, the de facto  dominance of the D-Mark as the
anchor currency, and hence the dominance of the Bundesbank in
determining European monetary policies was politically unsatisfactory.
Fourth,...the Delors Committee wanted national governments to remain
fully responsible for national macroeconomic and fiscal policies. Hence,
the need for multiple linkages – binding rules would be necessary to
contain budget deficits.’147
The technical and political role of such transnational epistemic
communities is well-known in the Community system now,148 but in the
late 1980s it received relatively little attention.149 With regard to EMU, it
derived from ‘the structural changes in the nature and structure of
capitalism, notably the relationship between EC states and global
financial markets and the phenomenon of inflation’.150  Few groups of
experts before or since have had such a profound impact on European
integration as the Delors Committee.
The Delors Committee did not, however, act in isolation from the
Member States. Indeed, it has been suggested that the Delors Committee
was established and given such an important role precisely because
many national governments realised their limited room for manoeuver
                                                        
146 Amy Verdun, 'The Role of the Delors Committee in the Creation  of the EMU: An
Epistemic Community?' (Research Colloquim Series: European Integration and
International Relations, Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute,
February 12, 1997).
147 Amy Verdun, 'The Role of the Delors Committee in the Creation  of the EMU: An
Epistemic Community?', (Research Colloquim Series: European Integration and
International Relations, Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute,
February 12, 1997), p 23.
148 See the special issue on committees: (1997) 3 European Law Journal.
149 See also David R. Cameron, 'Transnational Relations and the Development of
European Economic and Monetary Union', in Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed), Bringing
Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and
International Institutions (Cambridge University Press, 1995),  pp 37-78 at pp 73-74.
150 See  Amy Verdun, 'The Role of the Delors Committee in the Creation  of the EMU: An
Epistemic Community?' (Research Colloquim Series: European Integration and
International Relations, Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute,
February 12, 1997) .
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regarding monetary policy and sought specialist expertise concerning
further cooperation.151 We can understand the linkage between national
governments and monetary experts by using the theory of two-level
games.152 As Dyson argues,  ‘the EMS and EMU policy process is best
understood as composed of a distinct set of interdependent bargaining
relations and rules of the game, embedded in a framework of structures
that they have a limited, and fluctuating, capacity to influence’.153
Wolf and Zangl apply the theory of two-level games systematically
to EMU.154 They focus on two important issues, institutional choices and
strategies of institutionalisation. They distinguish among actors,
possible courses of action, and preferences. With regard to actors, they
conceptualise the negotiations ‘as a connection of two successive games
played by the governments of the major member-states - France,
Germany, Great Britain - and influenced by the most important
domestic actors - the central banks in France, Germany and Great
Britain’ .155  Monetary policy lacks the array of organised interest groups
which are characteristic of most policy areas.156 Central banks are the
only domestic actors which clearly have special interests in monetary
matters; the preferences of other actors are rarely voiced and instead are
embedded in market decisions. With regard to possible courses of action,
in respect of institutional choices they comprised EMU,  a parallel
currency concept, the EMS, or floating currencies.157 Possible courses of
action in respect of institutionalisation strategies were the locomotive
                                                        
151 Amy Verdun, 'The Role of the Delors Committee in the Creation  of the EMU: An
Epistemic Community?' (Research Colloquim Series: European Integration and
International Relations, Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute,
February 12, 1997), p 26.
152 The seminal article concerning two-level games is Robert Putnam, 'Diplomacy and
Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games' (1988) 42 International
Organization 427-469.
153 Kenneth Dyson, Elusive Union: The Process of Economic and Monetary Union in
Europe  (Longman, 1994), p. x.
154 Dieter Wolf and Bernhard Zangl, 'The European Economic and Monetary Union:
'Two-level Games' and the Formation of International Institutions', (1996) 2 European
Journal of International Relations.
155 Dieter Wolf and Bernhard Zangl, 'The European Economic and Monetary Union:
'Two-level Games' and the Formation of International Institutions', (1996) 2 European
Journal of International Relations, p 370.
156 This relatively narrow view of interests concentrates on subjective interests. For an
alternative view, which cannot be developed further here, see Francis Snyder, New
Directions in European Community Law  (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1990),
chapter 2.
157 See Dieter Wolf and Bernhard Zangl, 'The European Economic and Monetary
Union: 'Two-level Games' and the Formation of International Institutions', (1996) 2
European Journal of International Relations, pp 371-372.
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strategy, favoured by the economists, and the coronation strategy,
favoured by the monetarists.158
After analysing preferences,159 Wolf and Zangl conclude that the
first issue involved (a) a coordination game with distributional conflict at
the governmental level and (b)  a leader-veto situation at the domestic
level (UK leader, German veto). The second issue involved (a) a
coordination game with distributional conflict at the governmental level
(France, Germany) and (b) a veto-similar position at domestic level
(German veto, France similar).160 The first issue was resolved because 'it
was not likely that London and Bonn would block each other with
credible threats', and the second because 'only Bonn's threat not to
compromise was credible' (because of the Bundesbank's veto position), so
the solution corresponded to the German position.161 The second issue
was resolved because the Bundesbank held a veto on this issue (as well
as on the first). The French accepted the coronation strategy and the
convergence criteria, and in exchange obtained the creation of a weak
European Monetary Institute. 'Paris acknowledged that otherwise the
German government would not have been able to sign the Treaty'.162
To conclude this argument, it is useful to recall the position of the
Commission. Caught between proponents and opponents of the 'hidden
agenda' of federalism,163 the Commission embraced the principle of
                                                        
158 See Dieter Wolf and Bernhard Zangl, 'The European Economic and Monetary
Union: 'Two-level Games' and the Formation of International Institutions', (1996) 2
European Journal of International Relations, p 378.
159 The salient preferences in respect of the first issue were as follows: German
government:  EMU>PCC>EMS>FLOAT; Bundesbank: EMU>EMU>PCC>FLOAT;
UK government:PCC>EMU>EMS>FLOAT; Bank of England:
EMU>EM>PCC>FLOAT; note that France partly agreed with the UK government
position. The salient preferences in respect of the second issue were as follows: French
government: LS>CS>EMS; Banque de France LS>CS>EMS; German government:
CS>LS>EMS; Bundesbank: EMS>CS>LS. See Dieter Wolf and Bernhard Zangl, 'The
European Economic and Monetary Union: 'Two-level Games' and the Formation of
International Institutions', (1996) 2 European Journal of International Relations, pp
372-374, 379-381.
160 Dieter Wolf and Bernhard Zangl, 'The European Economic and Monetary Union:
'Two-level Games' and the Formation of International Institutions', (1996) 2 European
Journal of International Relations, p 381.
161 Dieter Wolf and Bernhard Zangl, 'The European Economic and Monetary Union:
'Two-level Games' and the Formation of International Institutions', (1996) 2 European
Journal of International Relations, p 374.
162 Dieter Wolf and Bernhard Zangl, 'The European Economic and Monetary Union:
'Two-level Games' and the Formation of International Institutions', (1996) 2 European
Journal of International Relations, p 383.
163 The expression is used (also within quotation marks) by Charles A.E. Goodhart,
'The Political Economy of Monetary Union', in Peter B. Kenen (Ed),: Understanding
Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open (Princeton University Press, 1995,
p 477.
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subsidiarity.164 This provided an intellectual balance between the two
groups, shifted the terrain of argument from the general to the
particular, and provided 'an intellectual smokescreen behind which the
ongoing decisionmaking process in the EC can result in a series of
pragmatic determinations leading either toward or away from greater
federalism'.165 It also reflected the Commission's assumption, which did
not however hold for Germany, that the principal loss of monetary
sovereignty occurred during the early ERM, and that the (mainly micro-
economic) benefits of monetary integration would take place only at the
final stage of EMU.166
3. SELECTED CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
EMU as expressed in the Maastricht Treaty involves a number of
controversial matters which, directly or indirectly, in the short-term or
the long-term, raise important legal issues. Despite their significance,
however, these legal issues are sometimes couched or camouflaged in
economic  language, which has been predominant in debates about EMU
until recently. This section focuses on selected issues which are related
directly to the EU constitution.167  It considers (a) the debate about
                                                        
164 See European Commission, One Market, One Money: An Evaluation of the Potential
Benefits and Costs of Forming and Economic and Monetary Union, European
Economy, No. 44 (1990), p 32.
165 Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political Economy of Monetary Union', in Peter B.
Kenen (Ed),: Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open
(Princeton University Press, 1995, p 477. Goodhart writes as an economist, not as a
lawyer, and most lawyers, including me, would hesitate to accept his characterisation
of the EC as a federation.
166 See Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political Economy of Monetary Union', in Peter B.
Kenen (Ed),: Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open
(Princeton University Press, 1995, p 482.
167 For reasons of space, however, it omits the new exchange rate mechanism, the
relation of participating Member States to non-participating Member States, and the
relation of participating Member States to third countries- As to external relations, see
generally European Commission, 'External Aspects of Economic and Monetary Union
(Commission Staff Working Document)', Europe Documents, No 2034, 8 May 19978, pp
1-9. See also  'Europe's Global Currency: Implications for Business Leaders and
Economic Policymakers', The Philip Morris Institute for Public Policy Research,
Conference Proceedings, Palazzio Lancellotti, Rome, 1-2 July 1996; Jacques Leonard
and Philippe Norel, 'Dollar-Euro: Des principes aux enjeux d'un système coopératif',
(1997) 405 Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne 92-110; Fabienne
Itzkovitz, 'Les perspectives de l'internationalisation de l'euro', (1996) 36 Revue de
l'économie financière 151-169; Jolin Dixon, 'The Euro and Its International
Implications', (1997) 3 Newsletter of the Instituto de Estudos Europeus de Macau 11-15;
'France-Afrique: Qui a peur de l'euro?', (1997) 1904 Jeune Afrique (2-8 Juillet) pp 70-71.
As to relations with the International Monetary Fund, see Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha,
'The Fund Agreement and the Surrender of Monetary Sovereignty to the European
Community', )1993) 30 Common Market Law Review 749-786. It also omits issues solely
of monetary law or private law, such as the introduction of the euro, conversion or
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whether the EU is an optimum currency area, (b) the timetable for
achieving EMU, (c)  the convergence criteria as a legal expression of the
coronation strategy, (d) the reallocation of policy instruments among
levels of governance, (e the new legal techniques which are being used to
implement EMU, and (f) the legitimacy of EMU.
(A) THE EU AS AN OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA
In order to gauge the feasibility of EMU, economists have asked whether
the EU is an optimum currency area. This question assumes that it is
possible to identify a geographical area which presents the ideal
economic and political characteristics for the establishment of a single
currency.168 Whatever the merits of this question in general terms, the
debate about EMU appears to have stimulated a reassessment of the
concept of an optimal currency area, at least as applied to EMU. In this
respect, it has been asserted that the concept of an optimal currency area
does not lead to any firm conclusions either for or against Maastricht
EMU.169 One distinguished economists has gone so far as to assert that
the theory has 'relatively little predictive power', because monetary
boundaries and optimum currency areas rarely coincide.170
                                                                                                                                                                
rounding, the continuity of contracts, and the legal status of the ECU. For further
discussion, see Marianne Lévy-Rosenwald, 'Les problèmes juridiques posés par la
monnaie unique', Revue de l'Economie Financière, 36, 1996, pp 112-122; D.R.R.
Dunnett, 'Some Legal Principles Applicable to the Transition to the Single Currency',
(1996) 33 Common Market Law Review 1133-1167; Hercules Booysen, 'A Future
Currency ECU: The Problem of Succession and the Private Law Implications', Journal
of World Trade, 28, 6, December 1994, pp 83-98; Ulrich Woelker, 'The Continuity of
Contracts in the Transition to the Third Stage of Economic and Monetary Union',
(1996) 33 Common Market Law Review 1107-1116. See also Council Regulation 1103/97
on certain provisions relating to the introduction of the euro, OJ 19.6.97 L162/1; Graham
Bishop, José Péres, and Sammy van Tuyll (eds), User Guide to the Euro (Federal Trust
and Sweet & Maxwell, 1996); Le Guide de l'Euro (Editions Jean-Francois Doumic,
1997); Derek Riley, 'L'Euro: Reflexions autour d'un scénario vraisemblable' (1997)
406 Revue du Marché commun et de l'Union européenne 175-191..
168 For an overview of the literature on optimum currency areas, see G. Tavlas 'The
'New' Theory of Optimum Currency Areas'  (1993) 16 The World Economy: 663-685
and  P. Bofinger, 'Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area?' (Centre of Economic Policy
Research  1994). For a critique of this literature as applied to EMU, see B. Winkler,
'Towards a Strategic View on EMU: A Critical Survey', (European University
Institute, Working Paper RSC No. 95/18, 1995).
169 Giorgia Giovannetti and Ramon Marimon , 'A Monetary Union for a Heterogeneous
Europe' (European University Institute, RSC No. 95/17, 1995), 7.
170 Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political Economy of Monetary Union', in Peter B.
Kenen (Ed),: Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open
(Princeton University Press, 1995: 452. See also B. Winkler, Towards a Strategic View
on EMU: A Critical Survey (European University Institute, working paper No. 95/18,
1995), p 1, who considers that the oca perspective ‘is little more than a special case of the
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The relevance of this debate to the EU constitution emerges clearly
if one considers the assumptions underlying theories of an optimum
currency area, and asks why these theories do not point unambiguously
in favour of  EMU. Goodhart makes the central point: ‘The largest
question ... about identifying the EC as an optimum currency area arises
from the empirical studies revealing that labor migration in Europe is
miniscule in comparison to that in the United States, and that any large
increase would cause political problems’.171  The question is important
because labour or capital mobility and the exchange rate are alternative
ways of dealing with economic shocks. Yet, as Goodhart points out, it is
very difficult to evaluate the relative effects of these alternatives.172 Since
labour mobility in the EU is low, however, the main instrument for
dealing with economic shocks so far has been the exchange rate.
From the legal standpoint, this apparently technical economic
debate raises three important questions. First, to what extent does EU
law provide adequate structures of governance for deciding, in a
legitimate and democratically accountable manner, which economic
policies should be given priority? Second, to what extent should EU (EC)
law encourage labour mobility, and to what extent can it do so effectively?
Third, if labour mobility within the EU continues to remain low, what
other instruments of governance are available to deal with economic
shocks after the establishment of a single currency? EMU, as will be
seen later, does not provide convincing answers to these questions.
(B) THE TIMETABLE FOR ACHIEVING EMU
According to the Maastricht Treaty, EMU is to be achieved in three
stages. This strategy has been criticised from the economic, political and
legal standpoints.173  From the economic standpoint it is an open question
whether EMU should have been achieved in a single overnight leap or
whether it should be achieved in stages. The main argument for the
former was its necessity to prevent destructive speculation, while the
                                                                                                                                                                
perennial debate over fixed versus floating exchange rates’.
171 Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political Economy of Monetary Union', in Peter B.
Kenen (Ed),: Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open
(Princeton University Press, 1995, p 463.
172 Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political Economy of Monetary Union', in Peter B.
Kenen (Ed),: Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open
(Princeton University Press, 1995,  p 465.
173 See e.g. Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political Economy of Monetary Union', in
Peter B. Kenen (Ed),: Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the
Open (Princeton University Press, 1995), p 483.
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latter was designed to facilitate economic convergence and (perhaps)
gather political support. But even though the strategy of stages was
chosen, the Member States, in particular Germany, still considered it
necessary to adopt subsequently a Stability Pact in order to channel and
coerce their partners into line. More specifically, even some time ago,
many economists considered that the second stage should have been
omitted, because in its early years it simply demonstrated that
increasingly fixed exchange rates would not necessarily lead to
economic convergence, contrary to the assumptions embodied in the
Treaty.
These economic strategies assume the appropriate political
conditions. From the political standpoint, however, it may be strongly
argued that not only was a strategy of stages indispensable, but also that
it should have involved a much more thorough public debate. In this
way,  the processes of creating institutions, choosing broad policies, and
constructing a constitution might conceivably have been based on a more
widespread deliberation. Constitutional litigation has served as a
surrogate for such deliberation in at least one Member State, 174 but this
is not feasible in all.  It may also be argued that the strategy of achieving
EMU in stages is based on a misguided or unrealistic conception of EU
monetary integration, or indeed integration in general. The idea
underlying EMU is that of multiple-speed Europe, but a forceful
argument can be made that a more appropriate starting point is the
notion of variable geometry. Such a conception of European monetary
integration demands a more multi-faceted strategy of cooperation than a
straightforward series of stages.175
From a legal perspective, the timetable raises two different issues.
First, is the timetable legally binding? The history of the Community is
full of examples when time limits have not been respected. In the
specific case of EMU, the German Federal Constitutional Court stated in
its  'Maastricht judgment' that the time for the beginning of the third
stage was a target, not a legally enforceable date.176 In addition, if the
                                                        
174 See the ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the complaint to the
effect that EMU should be postponed: Financial Times  Tuesday 10 March 1998, p 2 . See
also Agence Europe , No. 7136 (n.s.), Monday/Tuesday, 12/13 January 1998, p 9, and
No. 7137 (n.s.), Wednesday 14 January 1998, p 14..
175 On monetary union and flexible integration, see e.g. Centre for Economic Policy
Research, Flexible Integration: Towards a More Effective and Democratic Europe
(London, 1995), pp 127-147.
176 Manfred Brunner and others  v The European Union Treaty (Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 &
2159/92 before the Bundesverfassungsgericht (2. Senat) (German Federal
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'ins' had numbered five instead of the current eleven, it is unlikely that
EMU would have proceeded so far as it already has.177  Second, what are
the legal consequences of the timetable?  The Treaty provisions
regarding the third stage of EMU are concerned either with institutions
or with discretionary economic policy-making. Regardless of their
effects on national governments, they are unlikely to give rise to
enforceable claims on the part of individuals.178
(C) THE CONVERGENCE CRITERIA
The Maastricht (soon Amsterdam) Treaty requires the Commission and
the European Monetary Institute (EMI) to report to the Council on
Member States' progress towards EMU.179 The reports will form the basis
for the assessment by the Council of which Member States fulfil the
necessary conditions for the adoption of the single currency.180  Among
their key elements is an examination of Member States' economic
performance with reference to four different criteria.
These convergence criteria, the legal expression of the coronation
theory, are set down in the Treaty.181  Article 109j(1), first paragraph, EC
provides - and I emphasise its discretionary elements - as follows
(emphasis added):
'The reports shall also examine the achievement of a high degree  of
sustainable  convergence by reference to  the fulfilment by each Member
State of the following criteria:
· the achievement of a high degree  of price stability; this will be
apparent from a rate of inflation  which is closest to that of, at most, the
three best performing Member States in terms of price stability;
                                                                                                                                                                
Constitutional Court, 2nd  Chamber) (1994) 1 CMLR 57 at  99 (para. 83). One has only to
recall the pleas of various national governments as late as autumn 1997 to the effect that
the timetable should be renegotiated.
177 See also John A. Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in the European
Community (Clarendon Press, 1994),   p 154.
178 John A. Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in  the European
Community (Clarendon Press, 1994), pp 154-155. For a discussion as to whether the
procedures may be used after the deadlines have expired and  the effect of the expiration
of the deadlines on the relative competencies of the EC and the Member States, see John
A. Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in the European Community
(Clarendon Press, 1994), pp 155-156
179 Art. 109j(1) EC.
180 See Art. 109j(4) EC.
181 Art. 109j(1), first paragraph, EC.
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· the sustainability  of the government financial position; this will be
apparent from having achieved a government budgetary position
without a deficit that is excessive as determined in accordance with
Article 104c(6);
· the observance of the normal  fluctuation margins provided for  by
the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System for at
least two  years, without devaluing against the currency of any other
Member State;
· the durability  of convergence achieved by the Member State and of
the participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European
Monetary System being reflected in the long-term interest rate levels.'
These criteria and the relevant periods for assessing whether they have
been met are explicated in a Protocol annexed to the Treaty.182
According to this Protocol,183 the convergence criteria are as
follows (and again I emphasise those parts which would appear, even to
a non-economist, to leave room for discretion):
Article  1 The criterion on price stability referred to in the first indent
of Article 109j(1) of this Treaty shall mean that a Member State has a
price performance that is sustainable and an average rate of inflation,
observed over a period of one year before the examination , that does not
exceed more than 1 _  percentage points that of, at most, the three best
performing Member States in terms of price stability. Inflation shall be
measured by means of the consumer price index on a comparable basis,
taking in account differences in national definitions.
Article  2 The criterion on the government budgetary position referred
to in the second indent of Article 109j(1) of this Treaty shall mean that at
the time of the examination the Member State is not the subject of a
Council decision under Article 104c(6) of this Treaty that an excessive
deficit exists.
                                                        
182 Art. 109j(1), second paragraph, EC, which also provides that the 'reports of the
Commission and the EMI shall also take account of the development of the ECU, the
results of the integration of markets, the situation and development of the balance of
payments on current account and an examination of the development of unit labour
costs and other price indices.'
183 Protocol on the convergence criteria referred to in Article 109j of the Treaty
establishing the European Community, OJ 31.8.92 C224/121 (emphasis added).
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Article 3 The criterion on participation in the Exchange Rate
Mechanism of the
European Monetary System referred to in the third indent of Article
109j(1) of this Treaty shall mean that a Member State has respected the
normal  fluctuation margins provided for  by the Exchange Rate
Mechanism of the European Monetary System without severe tensions
for at least the last two years before the examination . In particular, the
Member State shall not have devalued its currency's bilateral central
rate against any other Member State's currency on its own initiative for
the same period.
Article 4 The criterion on the convergence of interest rates referred to
in the fourth indent of Article 109j(1) of this Treaty shall mean that,
observed over a period of one year before the examination , a Member
State has had an average nominal long-term interest rate that does not
exceed by more than 2 percentage points that of, at most, the three best
performing Member States in terms of price stability. Interest rates
shall be measured on the basis of long term government bonds or
comparable securities, taking in account differences in national
definitions.
Each of these criteria, as my emphasis shows, contains room for
interpretation. It is easy to give examples.
First, the exact dates to be used for the purposes of articles 1, 2 and
4 of the Protocol have only recently been decided. However, it is now
settled that they will be in early May 1998.
Second,  the meaning of  'normal' fluctuation margins was not
clear until recently. The original fluctuation margin set in 1979 for most
currencies was 4.5%, that is, 2.25% around bilateral rates.184 A wide
band of a 15% fluctuation margin was adopted on a temporary basis on 1-
2 August 1993. A year later at least one legal scholar submitted that this
wide band should be recognised as the 'normal' margin.185 The European
Council has recently confirmed that the standard fluctuation band will
be relatively wide;  186 its position was expressed in a resolution, which
                                                        
184 Except for the Italian lire and the Irish punt which began with a margin of 6% around
their respective bilateral rates and the pound sterling which stayed out.
185 J.A. Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in the European Community
(Clarendon Press, 1994), 141.
186 European Council, Resolution on the establishment of an exchange-rate mechanism
in the third stage of economic and monetary union, paragraph 1.7,  Annex II of the
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from the formal standpoint is not legally binding.187 On the basis of
precedent and practice, however, it is clear that political commitment,
credibility and trust far outweigh a lack of legally binding force.
Third, does Article 2 of the Protocol apply to potential candidates
for EMU which are not part of the current European Monetary System
(EMS)? The German Finance Minister Theo Waigel reportedly asserted
that the UK and Sweden could not participate in the common currency,
because they were not part of EMS so could not meet the criteria. To this,
the Swedish Finance Minister Erik Asbrink replied that the decisive
factor was the stability of the currency, not the length of participation in
the EMS. Diplomatically cutting the Gordian knot between the legalistic
and substantive positions,  Commissioner Guy de Silguy reportedly 'did
not take an explicit position on the quarrel, but on the substance of the
issue, sided with the Swedish Minister, saying that, in all the
Maastricht criteria, what counts is "sustainable stability" of the result
obtained'.188
 Fourth, the most controversial legal ambiguity concerns the
excessive deficit criterion189. The Maastricht Treaty requires Member
States to avoid excessive government deficits.190  The Commission is
responsible for monitoring Member States' budgetary performance.191  It
must in particular examine compliance with budgetary discipline on the
basis of the following criteria (once again, the ambiguities are
emphasised):192
(a) whether the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross
domestic product exceeds a reference value, unless
                                                                                                                                                                
Presidency Conclusions, European Council Amsterdam Summit, 16 June 1997,
published in Europe Documents No. 2043, Saturday 21 June 1997, pp 5-7 at p 6. It is
further expressly stated in paragraph 1.8 that, if closer links are allowed between the
euro and other currencies in the exchange-rate mechanism, the existence of such links,
particularly if it implied narrow fluctuation bands, would be without prejudice to the
interpretation of the exchange-rate criterion in Article 109j EC.
187 Similarly, the original (and current) EMS was created in 1979 by a European
Council resolution: see Resolution of the European Council of 5 December 1978, (1978) 12
EC Bulletin, pt. 1.1.11, The operating procedures were laid down by an Agreement
between the central banks of the Member States of 13 March 1979, revised version in
(1989) Compendium of Community Monetary Texts, p 50.  For further discussion, see
J.A. Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in the European Community
(Clarendon Press, 1994), 139-142. EMS 2 has recently been established in the same way;
see the preceding footnote.
188 Agence Europe, No. 6975 (n.s.), Friday 16 May 1997 p 6 (original emphasis omitted).
189 Expressed in Article 2 of the Protocol on the convergence criteria.
190 Art. 104c(1).
191 Art. 104c(2), first paragraph.
192 Art. 104c(2), first paragraph (emphasis added).
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- either the ratio has declined substantially  and continuously  and
reached a level that comes close  to the reference value;
- or, alternatively, the excess over the reference value is only exceptiona l
and temporary  and the ratio remains close  to the reference value;
(b) whether the ration of government debt to gross domestic product
exceeds a reference value, unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing
and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory  pace.
The reference values are specified in a Protocol on the excessive deficit
procedure.193 According to the Protocol,  the reference values are 3% for
the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic
product at market prices; and 60% for the ratio of government debt to
gross domestic product at market prices.,194
Despite their appearance, the excessive deficit criteria are not
carved in stone. On the contrary, their interpretation has been the
subject of almost continuous controversy. The lawyer steeped in legal
realism may perhaps take comfort from two points.
The first point stems from the Treaty itself. The Council195 is to
confirm which Member States qualify for EMU. It is to do so according to
procedures laid down by the Treaty.196 So far as the excessive deficit
criterion is concerned, the key provision would appear to be Article
104c(6). It provides that (again, emphasising the ambiguity):
The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a recommendation
from the Commission, and having considered any observations which
the Member State concerned may wish to make, decide after an overall
assessment  whether an excessive deficit exists.197
The scope for discretion, in other words for negotiation and compromise,
both significant features of EU legal culture,198 is obvious.
The second point is more recent in vintage. At the Ecofin Council
meeting on 9 June 1997, the German Finance Minister Waigel
                                                        
193 Art. 104c(1),  second paragraph.
194 Article 1, Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure, OJ 31.8.92 L224/120.
195 Meeting in the composition of Heads of State and Government: Art. 109j(4) EC.
196 See, in particular, Arts. 109j(4), which refers to Art. 109j(1) and (2), the first of which
refers in turn to Art. 104c(6).
197 Art. 104c(6) EC.
198 See F. Snyder, 'General Course on European Community Law: Constitutional Law of
the European Union', in Academy of European Law (ed), Collected Courses of the
Academy of European Law, Volume VI, Book (Kluwer, 1998), pp. 41-155.
© 1998 Francis Snyder
50
confirmed that Germany wanted the convergence criteria to be strictly
interpreted. To this well-known position, Jean-Claude Juncker, the
Prime Minister and Finance Minister of Luxembourg, and the current
President of the European Council, gave a reply. As reported in Agence
Europe, he explained that there would not be "strict interpretation of
criteria  but strict interpretation of the Treaty " (emphasis added). He
added that, in the Treaty there is "a margin of assessment which should
be used to advantage", which does not mean "diluting the criteria".... 199
This would seem to confirm my reinterpretation of Jacques Rueff....
Two other general points need to be made about the convergence
criteria. First, do they make sense, and if so, according to what
standards? Many economists consider the convergence criteria to be
arbitrary numbers, if not undesirable and ineffective.200 This point goes to
the question of the specific criteria. With regard to the utility of criteria
in general, however, Winkler argues persuasively that  the convergence
criteria serve several useful purposes. They express valid concerns
regarding risks in respect of price stability, economic convergence, and
putatively shared values of economic culture, and, I would add, legal
culture. They seek to reconcile conflicting interests, in particular by
integrating the demands of the Bundesbank and Germany.  They serve
'as an entry barrier or a screening device under incomplete
information'. They signal preferences or even induce the revelation of
preferences. Finally, they indicate the past and present 'stability culture'
of different countries.201  The last, as already noted, is not simply a
matter of political or economic culture but also, within an EU/EC still
marked profoundly by its original economic orientation, an extremely
                                                        
199 Agence Europe, No. 6991 (n.s.), Monday/Tuesday, 9/10 June 1997, p 8. For a similar
conclusion, see  Michael Artis, 'The Maastricht Road to Monetary Union'  (1992)  30
Journal of Common Market Studies, pp 299-309; Giorgia Giovannetti and Ramon
Marimon , A Monetary Union for a Heterogeneous Europe (European University
Institute, RSC No. 95/17, 1995), p 39; Patrick Artus, 'Les critères de convergence avant
l'Union monétaire: Perspectives et problèmes', (1996) 36 Revue de l'Economie
Financière 57-68 at  67.
200 See for example B. Winkler, 'Towards a Strategic View on EMU: A Critical
Survey',(European University Institute, Working Paper RSC No. 95/18, 1995), pp 12, 15;
Giorgia Giovannetti and Ramon Marimon , 'A Monetary Union for a Heterogeneous
Europe' (European University Institute, Working Paper RSC No. 95/17, 1995), p 50, who
point out that the criteria are based on economic conditions in the late 1980s and may not
be credible in different circumstances..
201  B. Winkler, 'Towards a Strategic View on EMU: A Critical Survey' (European
University Institute, Working Paper RSC No. 95/18, 1995), pp 13-15; the quotation is
from p 15.
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significant element in the emerging EU legal culture which has an
impact far beyond the domain of EMU.
A second general point is that, irrespective of their merits as entry
barriers to EMU, the convergence criteria are ill-adapted to serve as
operating rules for EMU.202 Elaborated so as to reflect economic
conditions during a specific period, they may not be appropriate to guide
economic policy coordination in different circumstances. This may be
especially the case for the 'ins' under conditions of a single currency, or
even for the 'outs' confronted with the 'ins' ' single currency.
Nevertheless, as shown later, these criteria will continue to guide EMU
members even during the third stage of EMU. It should also be noted,
however, that the Treaty does not appear to provide any means for
Member States to leave EMU, or for them to be ejected from EMU, even
though they may be sanctioned by political measures taken by other
Member States203 or by the Court of Justice in an action brought against
their central banks by the European Central Bank.204
(D)  POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE
The most profound legal issues in respect of EMU, in addition to its
legitimacy, concern the relationship between policy instruments and
levels of governance. We can understand these issues most easily by first
identifying three aspects of public policy, and then factoring them into
the ways in which EMU changes distribution of power in the EU system
of multilevel governance.
Public policy is usually deemed to encompass three functions: the
allocation of resources, stabilisation, and redistribution.205 The meanings
of the first and third functions are clear; the second function,
stabilisation, the second function, is oriented to such objectives as price
                                                        
202 See Giorgia Giovannetti and Ramon Marimon , 'A Monetary Union for a
Heterogeneous Europe' (European University Institute, Working Paper RSC No. 95/17,
1995),  pp 29-30.
203 As to the Stability Pact and accompanying regulations, see infra . .
204 See Art. 180(d) EC [ Art. 237(d) Amsterdam Treaty ] .
205 These functions were identified by J.M. Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of
Public Goods (Rand McNally, Chicago, 1968) and R.A. Musgrave and P. Musgrave,
Public Finance in Theory and Practice (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1976).  Willem
Molle adds a fourth, namely external relations: see Willem Molle, The Economics of
European Integation: Theory, Practice, Policy (Dartmouth, Aldershot, 3rd  edition),
relevant page in first edition are 27-28. See also Jacques Pelkmans, European
Integration: Methods and Economic Analysis (Longman, 1997) pp 265-306. Of course,
these functions need not be - and typically are not - all performed only by the state: see
Robin Murray, 'The Internationalization of Capital and the Nation State', (1971) 67
New Left Review 84.
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stability, economic growth, and employment. In order to achieve its
objectives, stabilisation typically involves recourse to fiscal policy (such
as taxation and public expenditure) and monetary policy (such as
exchange rates, interest rates, and money supply). Redistribution
usually entails mainly the use of fiscal policy.
In the EU structure of multilevel governance, these different
public policy functions may be assigned to the EC or the Member States
(or sometimes other levels of government, which are less directly
relevant here). The evolution of the legal framework of EMU since the
early 1960s, discussed earlier, has already altered the level of
governance at which some of these functions, or aspects of them, are
performed. The third stage of EMU will however have further dramatic
consequences. The power and responsibility regarding domestic
monetary policy and exchange rate policy will be transferred from the
national level to the EC level, while the Member States' powers in respect
of fiscal policy will be substantially reduced.  From the perspective of
Member States, the loss of these national policy instruments constitutes
macroeconomic losses. Against them in the balance of EMU must be
weighed what are essentially microeconomic benefits, such as a
reduction in transaction costs and the elimination of exchange rate
risks, as well as the possibility of an internationally stronger currency.206
The resulting balance, in the words of one distinguished economist,
'compares largely unquantifiable gains from greater microeconomic
efficiency in the functioning of money as a medium of exchange and unit
of account with more tangible losses in the authorities’ ability to conduct
macroeconomic demand management’.207
The extent to which these power shifts matter, and to whom, is
highly controversial. It is useful to emphasise two contrasting but
interrelated perspectives, first that of political economy, the other that of
constitutional law.
                                                        
206 For a survey, see European Commission, One Market, One Money: An Evaluation of
the Potential Benefits and Costs of Forming an Economic Union  European Economy,
No. 44, 1990, pp 63-84. For an evaluation, see Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political
Economy of Monetary Union', in Peter B. Kenen (Ed),: Understanding
Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open (Princeton University Press, 1995,
pp 458-460.
207 Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political Economy of Monetary Union', in Peter B.
Kenen (Ed),: Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open
(Princeton University Press, 1995, p 452, who adds that 'Neither the benefits nor the
costs appear to be large'.
© 1998 Francis Snyder
53
 From the standpoint of political economy, the effects of the
reallocation of power will depend fundamentally on two factors. The first
is the incidence and impact of major unanticipated political or economic
disturbances, of either internal or external origin or both, notably their
severity and whether their impact is symmetrical or asymmetrical,
either within a Member State or across the EU as a whole. The second is
the efficacy of existing policy instruments to deal with these shocks.
Such instruments may be either those at national level which can be
used in place of control of the exchange rate or those at EC level. 208
Unanticipated shocks are by definition unforeseeable, though the
same is not entirely true of the incidence of such shocks as may occur.209
But for the participants in the single currency, their instruments for
dealing with shocks will be limited to reliance on the market,
interventions in the market, in particular for labour, or fiscal policy.
Since the level of government expenditure is narrowly constrained by the
convergence criteria, this means that the main burden for adjustment
rests with labour market measures or taxation. So far, the
unemployment problem in most Member States has proved especially
intractable, and the labour market in Europe is far more rigid than in
roughly comparable continental systems. Most fiscal functions oriented
toward stabilisation or redistribution in the EC are currently taken at
national level,210.but in the absence of substantial public expenditure tax
                                                        
208 See, e.g., Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political Economy of Monetary Union', in
Peter B. Kenen (Ed),: Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the
Open (Princeton University Press, 1995, pp 460-461; B. Winkler, Towards a Strategic
View on EMU: A Critical Survey (European University Institute, working paper RSC
95/18, 1995), pp 3-4; Stephen Clarkson, 'Perché No? Qualms about Currency Union from
over the Sea' (Paper presented at the Workshop The Political and Institutional Deficits
of the European Integration Process, European University Institute, 30-31 May 1997), pp
5-6. Instruments which are alternatives to a floating exchange rate include, for
example, types of fiscal policy such as tax, microeconomic tools to the extent not
prohibited by the WTO agreements, local-level instruments, or reliance on the market
in the form of wage flexibility, labour mobility, or foreign capital: see Stephen
Clarkson, 'Perché No? Qualms about Currency Union from over the Sea' (Paper
presented at the Workshop The Political and Institutional Deficits of the European
Integration Process, European University Institute, 30-31 May 1997 1997, pp 5-8.
209 The impact of shocks depend in part on the degree of openness of the economy
concerned, its trade patterns, and the commodity composition of its imports and
exports.
210 This point is emphasised by Goodhart, Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political
Economy of Monetary Union', in Peter B. Kenen (Ed),: Understanding
Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open (Princeton University Press, 1995),
p 466, who  also argues  that a clear distinction should be drawn between stabilisation
and redistribution, with the former to be emphasised in the case of asymmetric shocks
and the latter in the case of anticipated regional divergence. The problem remains,
however, of asymmetric shocks which have important regional effects. As to national
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policy alone may prove insufficient. The danger is that if both labour
market and fiscal measures prove ineffective, EMU could result in the
divergence, not convergence, of participating states' economies.
Such a scenario raises fundamental issues of EU institutional
design and constitutional law. EMU removes from its Member State
participants the key instrument of national exchange rate policy and
limits their recourse to fiscal policy in the form of public spending. This
is the one of the aims of the convergence criteria, the Stability Pact, and
the convergence programmes. EMU also prohibits Member States from
making use of overdraft facilities with the European Central Bank (ECB)
or national central banks or from offering debt instruments for purchase
by the ECB or national central banks.211 It also confers on the ECB the
exclusive right to authorise the issue of bank notes within the
Community.212 It limits the access to capital markets of Member States
with an excessive budget deficit.213 At least one author has suggested that
technically the European System of Central Banks could come to the
rescue of a participating Member State in the event of economic shocks,214
but such an interpretation of the Treaty may stretch the bounds of
political feasibility.
Given these parameters, there is a real problem that existing
political and legal structures may not be adequate or appropriate for
performing the necessary economic functions. First, EMU fails to
establish the framework for a sufficiently strong fiscal policy at the EU
level of governance.215  Fiscal policy remains mainly at the national level.
Against the background of the weak sanctions provided by Article 103
EC, however, Goodhart suggests that either there will be little effective
coordination of national fiscal policies or, if there is, policymaking will
                                                                                                                                                                
fiscal systems, see European Commission, 'La fiscalité dans l'Union européenne:
Rapport sur l'évolution des systèmes fiscaux présenté par la Commission' (COM(96)
546 final, (1992) 2 Revue du Marché Unique Européen 181-191; European Commission,
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Towards Greater Fiscal
Discipline, European Economy, Reports and Studies, No. 3, 1994 (Luxembourg, 1995).
211 Art. 104(1) EC.
212 Art. 105a(1) EC.
213 Art. 104c(11), second indent, EC provides a Member State with an excessive deficit
may be required to publish additional information, to be specified by the Council before
issuing bonds and securities.
214 D.R.R. Dunnett 'Legal and Institutional Issues affecting Economic and Monetary
Union in David O'Keeffe and Patrick Twomey (eds) Legal Issues of the Maastricht
Treaty (Chancery Law Publishing,  1994), p 146.
215 See also D.R.R. Dunnett 'Legal and Institutional Issues affecting Economic and
Monetary Union in David O'Keeffe and Patrick Twomey (eds) Legal Issues of the
Maastricht Treaty (Chancery Law Publishing,  1994), p 145.
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in fact be transferred to the European level of governance.216 It is open to
question, however, whether it will be possible to retain fiscal functions at
national level in the context of a single currency, when decisions about
monetary policy will be taken at European level and decisions about
exchange-rate policy will be taken by national governments acting
jointly.217 In this case the EC/EU institutional architecture for making
fiscal policy decisions, in particular the respective roles of the Council
and the European Parliament, will be of crucial importance.218
This raises a second issue of constitutional significance. In the
absence of further political and legal development, there is a serious risk
of a major institutional gap at the heart of European integration. The
creation of supranational monetary institutions has not been
accompanied by the establishment of institutions for making decisions
about political priorities and choices among competing social values.
This point can be illustrated by referring to the debate about the Stability
Pact.
Few aspects of EMU have been more controversial recently than
the so-called 'Stability Pact'219. From the legal standpoint, we need to
refer to the Stability and Growth Pact, the Resolution on Growth and
Employment accompanying it, and the legal instruments for putting it
into effect. It began when, before the December 1995 Madrid Summit,
Germany proposed an agreement intended to maintain fiscal
discipline.220 In legal terms, the agreement would be (and is) designed to
                                                        
216 Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political Economy of Monetary Union', in Peter B.
Kenen (Ed),: Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open
(Princeton University Press, 1995), p 467.
217 See Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political Economy of Monetary Union', in Peter B.
Kenen (Ed),: Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open
(Princeton University Press, 1995) p 465. A former member of the Delors Committee has
written that this strategy 'may not be necessarily unworkable or naive, but it is
optimistic': Niels Thygesen, 'Why is Economic and Monetary Union an Important
Objective for Europe', (1994) 14 International Review of Law and Economics 133-145  at
p 139.
218 Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 'The EMU and Fiscal Policy in the New
European Community', (1994) 14 International Review of Law and Economics 147-161
conclude that fiscal policies capable of ensuring against asymmetric shocks can be
enforced if decision-making in centralised, e.g. within the Council, but that this is
much less likely to be the case if decision-making is decentralised, e.g. within the
European Parliament..
219 See also Pierre Maillet, 'Le Pacte de Stabilité et de Croissance: Portée et limites du
Compromis de Dublin', (!997) 404 Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne
5-12; Michael J Artis and Bernhard Winkler, 'The Stability Pact: Safeguarding the
Credibility of the European Central Bank',Discussion Paper No. 1688, Centre for
Economic Policy Research, August 1997.
220 See Agence Europe, 9 November 1995, No 6601, p 5.
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ensure that Member States respected their obligation to avoid an
excessive deficit,221 as defined in the Treaty222 and its accompanying
Protocol.223
As endorsed by the European Council in Madrid, and reiterated in
a Commission report to the June 1996 Florence Summit, the agreement
was to be based on the  principles that it should
· be achieved in the context of and according to the procedures of the
Treaty;
· be agreed at the level of the Union, even though its full application
would only concern the Member States participating in the single
currency, and
· confirm that the requirements for participation in EMU, either in the
first group or at a later date, should in no way be changed.224
It would include a kind of 'early warning system, based upon the
intensification of existing practice with convergence programmes and
multilateral surveillance exercise'.225 Participating Member States
would submit 'stability programmes. Secondary legislation based on
Article 103(5)226 would define the basic elements of these programmes
and lay down the steps of surveillance by the Union. If a Member State
ran an excessive deficit, the excessive deficit procedure would come into
play.227 Secondary legislation based on Article 104c(14)228 would set out the
time limits for the various steps of the procedure, clarify the conditions
for imposing sanctions, and define the type, scale and timing of
sanctions.
                                                        
221 The obligation is stated in Art. 104c(1) EC.
222 Art. 104c(2)(a) EC.
223 Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure, Art. 1, first indent, OJ 31.8.92 L224/120.
224 European Commission, 'Preparation of Economic and Monetary Union: A Review of
the Situation (Communication by the Commission to the European Council)', Europe
Documents, No. 1992, 4 July 1996, at 3.
225 Id.
226 This Article provides inter alia that the Council, acting in accordance with the
procedure referred to in Article 189c, may adopt detailed rules for the multilateral
surveillance procedure.
227 This procedure is laid down in Arts. 104c(7)-(14) EC and in the Protocol on the
excessive deficit procedure, OJ 31.8.92 L224/120.
228 This Article provides inter alia (in the second paragraph) that the Council shall,
acting unanimously and after consulting the European Parliament and the ECB, adopt
the appropriate provisions which shall then replace the Protocol on excessive deficit
procedure.
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As directed by the European Council, and following further
work,229 the Commission submitted a report to the December 1996
European Council in Dublin.230 At 3 am on Thursday 12 December 1996,
after eleven hours of discussion and numerous bilateral meetings, the
Ecofin Council reached agreement on a Stability and Growth Pact. It
reported to the European Council, having reached a conclusion on all
matters except for the precise statistical definition of a serious recession,
which would warrant a public deficit greater than the 3% of GDP
ceiling. The Dublin European Council on 13-14 December welcomed the
agreement. It requested Ecofin to establish a working group to examine
two accompanying Commission proposals for regulations, one on the
strengthening of the surveillance and coordination of budgetary
positions, and the other on speeding up and clarifying the
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure.231 It also invited the
Ecofin Council to prepare a draft Resolution on the Stability and Growth
Pact to be adopted by the European Council in June 1997. 232
After the Dublin Summit French President Jacques Chirac
'explained that there was no difference of opinion between the Fifteen' on
the 'European economic government' that he would like to see in place.
'He said that, in a form still to be determined, the members of the
Council and of the European Council whose countries are within the
euro will represent an  authority to confront the European Central Bank
and it is at this level that there will be dialogue':233  However, not only
were these matters a subject of disagreement between Germany and
France: they and EMU in general was extremely controversial in
                                                        
229 See Agence Europe, No. 6805 (n.s.)m Friday, 6 September 1996, p 4.
230 Commission proposal for a Council Regulation on the strengthening of the
surveillance and co-ordination of budgetary positions; proposal for a Council
Regulation on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit
procedure,
COM(96)496 final, OJ 6.12.1996 C368/9 - 96/0247 (SYN) & 96/0248 (CNS), OJ 6.12.1996
C368/9.
231 For the subsequent version of these proposals, see Commission of the European
Communities, Amended proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on the strengthening
of the surveillance and coordination of budgetary policies (presented by the
Commission pursuant to Article 189a(21) of the EC-Treaty), COM(97) 116 final - 96/0247
(SYN), Brussels 19.3.97; Commission of the European Communities, Amended
proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on speeding up and clarifying the
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (presented by the Commission
pursuant to Article 189a(2) of the EC-Treaty), COM(97) 117 final - 96/0248 (CNS),
Brussels 19.3.97.
232 Agence Europe, No. 6875 (Special Edition), Sunday 15 December 1996, p 3. For further
details, see the Report by the ECOFIN Council to the European Council, 'The
Preparations for Stage 3 of EMU', Europe Documents, No 2015/16, 18 December 1996.
233 Agence Europe, No. 6875 (Special Edition), Sunday 15 December 1996, p 3.
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France. Partly as a result, after Chirac called for a spring election, his
party suffered severe losses, and he eventually appointed the Socialist
Lionel Jospin as Prime Minister. This political 'cohabitation'
immediately altered the terms of the debate.
Since its  inception as a German proposal, the Stability Pact had
changed title, but its contents remained overwhelmingly devoted to
stability, not growth. This point was noted by many commentators and
participants in the political process.234  Following the French elections,
former Commission President Jacques Delors proposed at the congress
of the Party of European Socialists that the Stability Pact should be
"complemented" with a protocol setting out the conditions in which MS
"will coordinate their economic policies with a view to genuine
convergence of their growth and employment policies".235 A resolution by
the European Trade Union Federation (ETUC), addressed to the
forthcoming Amsterdam European Council, called for the Treaty to be
applied so that transition to the single currency was accompanied by
effective coordination of economic policies.236
Then the new French Minister of Economy and Finance,
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, dropped a bombshell. He told the Ecofin that
France's new government could not subscribe to the Pact for Stability
and Growth: it needed to evaluate and review the Pact in order to achieve
a better balance between budgetary discipline and employment policy. He
proposed, or at least floated, two potential developments. On the one
hand, more emphasis should be given to Articles 102a and 103 EC; these
principles on economic coordination should be stated clearly in the Pact.
On the other hand, he reiterated the long-standing French concern
about the political nature of monetary policy, saying that 'there needs to
be a sort of political responsibility, capable of ensuring coordination of
economic policies', 'without placing the ECB back into question'.237
The first proposal received wider support, but the second did not.
The Dutch Foreign Minister and Council President, Gerrit Zalm,
                                                        
234 For example, MEP Christodoulou (Greek EPP), presenting reports to the European
Parliament Plenary Session, Wednesday 28 May 1997, who also remarked on the ridig
and mechanical nature of the Pact: Agence Europe, No. 6983 (n.s.) Thursday 29 May
1997 p 10.  In fact, virtually the only direct reference to growth was contained in
paragraph 18, which noted that 'Sound government finances ... are an essential
condition for sustainable and non-inflationary growth and a high level of
employment'.
235Agence Europe, No. 6990 Saturday 7 June 1997 p 3 (original emphasis omitted).
236 Agence Europe, No. 6991 (n.s.) Monday/Tuesday, 9/10 June 1997, p 4.
237 Agence Europe, No. 6991 (n.s.) Monday/Tuesday, 9/10 June 1997 p 6-7; the direct
quotations from Minister Strauss-Kahn are from p 7.
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interpreted the reaction to the former as one of 'considerable
enthusiasm' for incorporating Articles 102a and 103 into a protocol
attached to the Pact. However, the German Permanent Representative,
Mr von Kiaw made it clear that while his Government was 'prepared to
examine closer coordination of economic polices', it was 'against an
economic government that would challenge the independence of the
European Central Bank'.238 Commission President Santer, speaking at
the European Parliament, referred to a 'pact for growth, creator of jobs'.
Noting that Ecofin had 'recognised the need for EMU to walk on its two
feed, monetary and economic', he emphasised that the Union should use
the Article 103 procedures to their fullest extent. Later, in a press
conference, he noted that the Pact itself started life as a European
Council resolution, then was complemented by legally binding
regulations. However, he rejected any suggestion that the Union needed
'economic government'. In his view, 'our generation will see neither
economic government nor political government' in Europe'239.
Work then started on a draft resolution to be submitted to the
Amsterdam European Council. It was to consist of a single text, dealing
with both economic coordination and employment. As Agence Europe
pointed out, 'Subsidiarity will be fully respected. There is no question of
Member States giving up their national economic policies, but simply of
better coordination at European level.... 240  There followed a flurry of
meetings, in particular between senior Commission officials and senior
French politicians. The Commission then confirmed that the outcome
would probably be a European Council Resolution, which would be
'counterpart' of the previously envisaged Resolution on the Stability and
Growth Pact.241 By this time the fate of these Resolutions was intertwined
with that of the 'Maastricht II' Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty.
The European Summit at Amsterdam reached agreement on both
matters. In addition to the new Treaty, to be signed in Amsterdam in
October 1997, it adopted a Stability Pact and Growth Pact, a Resolution on
Growth and Employment, and various other texts on the third stage of
                                                        
238 Agence Europe, No. 6991 (n.s.), Monday/Tuesday, 9/10 June 1997, p 6; see also
Agence Europe, No. 6992 (n.s.), Wednesday, 11 June 1997, pp 4-5..
239 His view was that 'We do not wish to have a Keynesian policy and launch major
programmes': see Agence Europe, No. 6993 (n.s.), Thursday, 12 June 1997, pp 2, 6.
240 Agence Europe No. 6993 (n.s.), Thursday, 12 June 1997, pp 6-7.
241 Agence Europe, No. 6994 (n.s.), Friday, 13 June 1997, p 7.
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EMU.242 Here I focus on the Stability Pact and the other texts directly
related to it.
The Stability and Growth Pact is expressed as a European Council
Resolution, together with two Council regulations. The Resolution is not
legally binding but provides 'political guidance', both generally and, in
particular, regarding the context and the implementation of the two
regulations which of course have legal force. The Resolution is stated to
be consistent with the Treaty, which however it amplifies and interprets
('gives precision to') on numerous points. To be fully effective, it
requires, among other things, the enactment of various Council
regulations, as well as the eventual modification of the Financial
Regulation before the end of 1998.. The Amsterdam European Council
'invited' the Council to adopt these without delay.243: an invitation which
is difficult to refuse, given the hierarchical relationship between the two
Councils and their respective composition
The European Council Resolution on the Stability and Growth
Pact provides as follows:244
I. Meeting in Madrid in December 1995, the European Council
confirmed the crucial importance of securing budgetary discipline in
stage three of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In Florence, six
months later, the European Council reiterated this view and in Dublin,
in December 1996, it reached an agreement on the main elements of the
Stability and Growth Pact. In stage three of EMU, Member States shall
avoid excessive general government deficits: this is a clear Treaty
obligation (fn re non-application to UK under Art 5 of Protocol 11, and re
obligation under Art 109e(4) on continued application to UK to endeavour
to avoid excessive deficits). The European Council underlies the
importance of safeguarding sound government finances as a means to
strengthening the conditions for price stability and more sustainable
growth conducive to employment creation. It is also necessary to ensure
that national budgetary policies support stability oriented monetary
policies. Adherence to the objective of sound budgetary positions close to
balance or in surplus will allow all Member States to deal with normal
                                                        
242 Agence Europe, No. 6998 (n.s.), Thursday 19 June 1997, p 3.
243 Presidency Conclusions, Amsterdam European Council, 16-17 June 1997, Europe
Documents, No. 2041/42, Friday 20 June 1997.
244 Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, Annex I of
Presidency Conclusions, Amsterdam European Council, 16-17 June 1997, in Europe
Documents, No. 2043, Saturday, 21 June 1997, pp 2-3.
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cyclical fluctuations while keeping the government deficit within the 3
percent of GDP reference value.
II Meeting in Dublin in December 1996, the European Council
requested the preparation of a Stability and Growth pace to be achieved
in accordance with the principles and procedures of the Treaty. This
Stability and Growth pact in no way changes the requirements for
participation in stage three of EMU, either in the first group or at a later
date. Member States remain responsible for their national budgetary
policies, subject to the provisions of the Treaty; they will take the
necessary measures in order to meet their responsibilities in accordance
with those provisions.
III. The Stability and Growth pact, which provides both for prevention
and deterrence, consists of this Resolution and two Council Regulations,
one on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and
the surveillance and coordination of economic policies and another on
speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit
procedure.
IV. The European Council solemnly invites all parties, namely the
Member States, the Council and the Commission, to implement the
Treaty and the Stability and Growth pact in a strict and timely manner.
This resolution provides firm political guidance to the parties who will
implement the Stability and Growth pact. To this end, the European
Council has agreed upon the following guidelines
The Member States
1. commit themselves to respect the medium-term budgetary
objective of close to balance or in surplus set out in their stability or
convergence programmes and to take the corrective budgetary action
they deem necessary to meet the objectives of their stability or
convergence programmes, whenever they have information indicating
actual or expected significant divergence from those objectives;
2. are invited to make public, on their own initiative, the Council
recommendations made to them in accordance with Article 103(4);
3. commit themselves to take the corrective budgetary action they
deem necessary to meet the objectives of their stability or convergence
programmes once they receive an early warning in the form of a Council
recommendation issued under Article 103(4);
4. will launch the corrective budgetary adjustments they deem
necessary without delay on receiving information indicating the risk on
an excessive deficit;
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5. will correct excessive deficits as quickly as possible after their
emergence; this correction should be completed no later than the year
following the identification of the excessive deficit, unless their are
special circumstances;
6. are invited to make public, on their own initiative,
recommendations made in accordance with Article 104c(7);  (2/3)
7. commit themselves not to invoke the benefit of Article 2 paragraph
3 of the Council Regulation on speeding up and clarifying the excessive
deficit procedure unless they are in severe recession; in evaluating
whether the economic downturn is severe, the Member States will, as a
rule, take as a reference point an annual fall in real GDP of at least
0,75%.
The Commission
1. will exercise its right of initiative under the Treaty in a manner
that facilitates the strict, timely and effective functioning of the Stability
and Growth Pact;
2. will present, without delay, the necessary reports, opinions and
recommendations to enable the adoption of Council decisions under
Article 103 and Article 104c; this will facilitate the effective functioning
of the early warning system and the rapid launch and strict application
of the excessive deficit procedure;
3. commits itself to prepare a report under Article 104c(3) whenever
there is the risk of an excessive deficit or whenever the planned or actual
government deficit exceeds the 3 per cent of GDP reference value,
thereby triggering the procedure under Article 104c(3);
4. commits itself, in the event that the Commission considers that a
deficit exceeding 3% of GDP is not excessive and this opinion differs from
that of the Economic and Financial Committee, to present in writing to
the Council the reasons for its position:
5. commits itself, following a request from the Council under Article
109d, to make, as a rule, a recommendation for a Council decision on
whether an excessive deficit exists under Article 104c(6).
The Council
1. is committed to a rigorous and timely implementation of all the
elements of the stability and growth pact in its competence; it will take
the necessary decisions under Article 103 and Article 104c as quickly as
is practicable;
2. is urged to regard the deadlines for the application of the excessive
deficit procedure as upper limits; in particular, the Council, acting
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under Article 104c(7), shall recommend that excessive deficits will be
corrected as quickly as possible after their emergence, no later than the
year following their identification, unless there are special
circumstances;
3. is invited always to impose sanctions if a participating Member
State fails to take the necessary steps to bring the excessive deficit
situation to an end as recommended by the Council:
4. is urged always to require a non-interest bearing deposit,
whenever the Council decides to impose sanctions on a participating
Member State in accordance with Article 104c(11);
5. is urged always to convert a deposit into a fine after two years of
the decision to impose sanctions in accordance with Article 104c(11),
unless the excessive deficit has in the view of the Council been corrected;
6. is invited to always state in writing the reasons which justify a
decision not to act, if at any stage of the excessive deficit or surveillance
of budgetary positions procedures the Council did not act on a
Commission recommendation, and, in such a case, to make public the
votes cast by each Member State.
The detailed implementing provisions for the Pact are contained in two
Council regulations.
The first implementing regulation, based on Article 103(5) EC,
concerns multilateral surveillance.245 It sets out the  rules covering the
submission, examination and monitoring of stability programmes and
convergence programmes.246 The second implementing regulation,
based on Article 104c(14), second subparagraph, EC, concerns speeding
up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit
procedure.247 Together with  Protocol No 5 on the excessive deficit
procedure, attached to the Treaty, it constitutes a new set of integrated
rules for the application of Article 104c EC, which sets out the excessive
deficit procedure.248  
                                                        
245 Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic
policies, OJ 2.8.97 L209/1.
246 Ibid., art. 1. These programmes fufil the function of the presentation of information
for purposes of multilateral surveillance, in the terms of Art. 103(3), second paragraph,
EC: see Preamble, seventh recital, and arts. 3(1) and 4(1)..
247 Council Regulation (EC) 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the
excessive deficit procedure, OJ 2.8.97 L209/6.
248 Ibid., Preamble, first recital.
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Accompanying the Stability Pact was a European Council
Resolution on Growth and Employment. Both the Council Resolution at
the origin of the Stability Pact and the Council Resolution on Growth and
Employment were political instruments which, taken alone, have no
legally binding force. Unlike the Stability Pact, however, the
Employment Resolution did not immediately involve any legally binding
secondary legislation. It was accompanied by the amendment of the
Maastricht Treaty so as to include, in the  Amsterdam Treaty, a new
Title on employment, with the aim of implementing a coordinated
employment strategy by means of the coordination of national
employment policies, the use of incentive measures, and the
establishment of a committee on employment.249 But it is open to question
whether EMU and the Amsterdam Treaty together provide  a sufficient
legal framework for a strong, coherent EU employment policy.  On the
one hand, there is substantial doubt about the likelihood of a European-
level programme of social protection for workers.250 On the other hand,
the reform of the welfare states in Europe has so far, with occasional
exceptions, been mainly a concern of national governments.251 This
points once again to the current political vacuum at the heart of the
European Union.
Institutional changes to remedy these deficiencies are likely to be
politically unacceptable to many Member States. This applies to the
creation of a real fiscal federalism, the development of a stronger EU
employment policy, the creation of other EU policies for economic
stabilisation,252 or a more active policy of economic redistribution. As the
                                                        
249 See new Title VI, including Arts. 109n-109r EC. [ Arts.  125-129 EC per Amsterdam
Treaty ] . See also the amendments to Art. B TEU  [ Art. 2 TEU per Amsterdam Treaty ]
and Art. 2 EC.
250 See Streeck, Trubek, Bercusson et al, Sciarra on globalisation, M. Rhodes., A New
Social Contract? Globalisation and West European Welfare States (European
University Institute working paper, RSC No. 96/43, 1996); M. Rhodes, 'Globalisation.
Labour Markets and Welfare States: A Future of 'Competitive Corporatism' (European
University Institute working paper, RSC No. 97/36, 1997).  See also Pierre Guibentif
and Denis Bouget, Minimal Income Policies in the European Union (Uniao das
Mutualidades Portuguesas, 1997).
251 See also  David Mayes, 'European Economic Cooperation, Economic and Monetary
Union, and the Need for a European Social Policy', in P. Kosonen and Pk:k Madsen
(eds), Convergence or Divergence? Welfare States Facing European Integration
(Publications Office of the European Communities, 1995), pp 59-76; Giorgia Giovannetti
and Ramon Marimon , 'A Monetary Union for a Heterogeneous Europe' (European
University Institute, Working Paper RSC No. 95/17, 1995), pp 8-9
252 ‘Virtually no stabilization is achieved through the current federal budget': see:
Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political Economy of Monetary Union', in Peter B. Kenen
(Ed),: Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open (Princeton
University Press, 1995), p 469 ;
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Franco-German debate about the Stability Pact shows, there is currently
no political agreement in support of such changes to the EU
constitution.253  This is reflected in legal principles, such as the principle
of subsidiarity or the legal requirement in Article  199 EC that the EC
run a balanced budget. It was encapsulated neatly in a warning given by
the Swedish Prime Minister in December 1996 against the possibility
that, by leading to fiscal federalism, EMU would transform the EU into a
federation, and thus into 'something completely different than the EU
the Swedish people, after some agony and a long and trying debate,
approved' at the 1994 referendum.254
(E) CONVERGENCE PROGRAMMES
The origins of EMU as an unusual graft combining high politics with
'comitology''255 are mirrored in the novel legal techniques that have been
used thus far in its practical governance. We have already seen that the
Stability Pact combines a non-legally-binding instrument, a European
Council Resolution, in other words 'soft law' at the highest level, with
two Council Regulations, both products of Ecofin, that is, highly
technical economic regulations rivalled in the Community system only
by agricultural measures. Here I focus on another legal instrument,
namely convergence programmes. Convergence programmes are the
legal and policy instruments for achieving economic convergence,
which in theory is a precondition for entry into EMU.  But what are
                                                        
253‘Within the EC... there is not now, or in sight, an agreement that all area inhabitants
should have broadly the same menu of benefits and taxes. Indeed there is scarcely
accord on minimum standards for the provision of public goods. Insofar as
redistribution takes place at all, it occurs through the more covert mechanism of
structural, or cohesion, funds, which are themselves subject to a variety of operational
problems’: Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political Economy of Monetary Union', in
Peter B. Kenen (Ed),: Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the
Open (Princeton University Press, 1995), p 468.  
254 Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson, in an editorial published in  Svesnska
Dagbladet, quoted in Agence Europe, No 6883 (n.s.); Monday/Tuesday 30/31 December
1996, p 3. To put it another way, ‘Centralising policy ... entails welfare losses to the
extent that preferences are heterogeneous’: B. Winkler, Towards a Strategic View on
EMU: A Critical Survey (European University Institute, working paper RSC 95/18,
1995), p 5.
255 That is, 'comitology' in the broad sense of recourse to specialist committees, not in
the narrow sense of committees governed by Council Decision 87/373, OJ 13.7.87
L197/33, on the exercise by the Commission of powers delegated to it by the Council.
D.R.R. Dunnett 'Legal and Institutional Issues affecting Economic and Monetary
Union in David O'Keeffe and Patrick Twomey (eds) Legal Issues of the Maastricht
Treaty (Chancery Law Publishing,  1994), p 144 n73 quotes Smit & Herzog, (1982-1992),
3-630.17 to the effect that ‘Article 109c of the Treaty bears embarrassing witness to the
successful effort of unelected and yet not independent officials to constitutionalise their
position of power’ .
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convergence programmes, what is their legal basis, are they legally
binding, and what if anything ensures that they will be put into practice?
The expression 'convergence programmes' refers to reports
prepared by the Member States regarding their macro-economic
situation, in particular (but not only) inflation rate and public spending.
Such programmes predate the Treaty on European Union.256 The first
phase of EMU began on 1 July 1990. In preparation, Council Directive
90/141 of 12 March 1990257 enabled the Council to undertake twice-yearly
multilateral surveillance of all aspects of Member States' short-term and
medium-term economic policy. A political agreement at an informal
Ecofin Council meeting on 10-11 May 1991, anticipating the Maastricht
Treaty,258 called for the more systematic presentation of reports prepared
for this purpose by the Member States. This agreement was consecrated
by the 26-27 June 1991 Luxembourg Summit, which also noted the
intention of various governments to present a report. On 11 November
1991 the first report was presented to the Ecofin Council by Italy. It was
followed by reports from Ireland, Germany, Portugal, Spain, the
Netherlands, Belgium, Greece and the United Kingdom.
Convergence programmes thus were already in use before the
Maastricht Treaty. Though mandated by Council Decision 90/141,
convergence programmes were initially not Community legal
instruments, nor were they legally binding. Instead they relied for their
efficacy and implementation on administrative and political relations
between national governments and Community (and Union)
institutions, in particular the Commission and Ecofin. However, they
soon became an indispensable element in the multilateral surveillance
of Member States' economic policies in the light of the convergence
criteria and the Council's broad economic guidelines.259
                                                        
256 According to Art. 102a(1), which was added to the EEC Treaty by the Single European
Act,  the Member States were required to cooperate  'In order to ensure the convergence
of economic and monetary policies which is necessary for the further development of
the Community'. However, it was not until the early 1990s that specific instruments
were adopted for this purpose. The remainder of this paragraph is based on J. Closs, G.
Reinesch, D. Vignes and J. Weyland, Le Traité de Maastricht: Genèse, Analyse,
Commentaires (Bruylant, 1993),  pp 177-180 They remark that these programmes were
initially known as 'crash programmes' (p 179, n 34)..
257 Council Decision 90/141/EEC of 12 March 1990 on the attainment of progressive
convergence of economic policies and performance during stage one of economic and
monetary union, OJ 24.3..90 L78/23.
258 Namely Art. 109e(2)(a), second indent, as to which see below.
259 As to the broad economic guidelines, see Art. 103(2), (3), (4). See also Commission's
recommendation for the Broad Guidelines of the Economic Policies of the Member
States and the Community, COM(96) 211 final; Council Recommendation (EC) 96/431
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The Maastricht Treaty enlarged and consolidated the range of
Community instruments concerned with monetary integration. In
respect of convergence programmes, the Treaty required Member States,
prior to the beginning of the second stage of EMU on 1 January 1994,260 to
adopt, if necessary, with a view to permitting the assessment provided
for in subparagraph (b), multiannual programmes intended to ensure
the lasting convergence necessary for the achievement of economic and
monetary union, in particular with regard to price stability and sound
public finances.261
The Maastricht Treaty also reinforced the multilateral surveillance
procedure, designed as a means of coordinating Member States'
economic policies.262 It also created the excessive deficit procedure,
intended to ensure fiscal discipline.263 Though formally distinct, the
three procedures all concern budgetary discipline and in practice have
tended to be linked.264
Revised convergence programmes have recently been presented by
France 1997-2001),265 Germany (1997-2000),266 Ireland267 and Italy (1998-
2000).268  We can take the Italian programme as an example. Worked out
by the Italian authorities, in conjunction with the Commission services,
it provided for structural reforms in four areas: pensions, social
                                                                                                                                                                
on the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the
Community, OJ 18.7.96 L179/46.; Commission's Recommendations for the Broad
Guidelines of the Economic Policies of the Member States and the Community,
COM(97)168 final:
Commission, Progress report on the implementation of the 1996 Broad Economic Policy
Guidelines, COM(97)169 final; Council Recommendation 97/479 on the broad economic
guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Commuity, OJ 2.8.97
L209/12.
260 As provided by Art. 109e(1) EC.
261 Art. 109e(2)(a), second indent, EC.
262 See Arts. 102a and 103 EC. Multilateral surveillance formally began in 1990 and was
subsequently governed by Council Decision 90/141/EEC of 12 March 1990 on the
attainment of progressive convergence of economic policies and performance during
stage one of economic and monetary union, 24.3.1990 L78/3.
263 Art. 104c EC and the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure. As to the excessive
deficit procedure, see supra. Council Decision 90/141 ,24.3.1990 L78/23
264 For a more detailed comparison, see Robert Brookes, 'Parliamentary Scrutiny of UK
Convergence Programmes: the One that Got Away', (1996) 2 European Public Law 437-
451 at pp  445-447, 449-450.
265 See Agence Europe, No. 6936 (n.s.), Monday/Tuesday, 17/18 March 1997, pp 8-9.
266 See Agence Europe, No. 6936 (n.s.), Monday/Tuesday, 17/18 March 1997, pp 8-9.
267 See Agence Europe, No. 6991 (n.s.), Monday/Tuesday, 9/10 June 1997, p 8.
268 See Agence Europe, No. 7002 (n.s.), Wednesday 25 June 1997, p 7; No. 7010 (n.s.),
Saturday, 5 July 1997, p 6; No. 7012 (n.s.), Wednesday 9 July 1997, p 8.
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security, the civil service, and taxation. Its goals by the year 2000 were a
decrease in the budget deficit to 1.8%, a decrease in global public debt to
116.3%, a drop in inflation to 1.5%, a fall in unemployment to 10.4%, and
an increase in employment by 0.9%. This was expected to lead to a fall in
interest rates, hence a reduction in the debt service burden from 10.8%
as of 1997 to 7.28% of GDP and a reduction in the overall fiscal charge to
47.8% of GDP.  The flexibility of the labour market and the privatisation
of state-owned companies was to continue. The programme in draft
form was welcomed by the Commission as 'encouraging'.269
The Ecofin Council270 discussed the Italian programme at its 7
July 1997 meeting. It 'acknowledged with satisfaction the remarkable
progress in convergence achieved by Italy, particularly as regards
inflation, interest rates and currency stability'. It emphasised the
crucial importance of the political commitment behind the programme's
budgetary objectives. However, it invited the Italian authorities to
consider the budgetary objectives as 'ceilings'. It also pointed out that,
while the assumptions on growth and interest rates were reasonable,
the evolution of interest rates would depend on low inflation and
monetary stability and on successful budgetary structural adjustment.
Reform measures should aim in particular at the reduction of the
national deficit. Structural reforms were 'most welcome'. Most
important were 'the reform of the welfare state,' notably pensions, and of
the tax system, especially avoiding revenue shortfalls. On the basis of its
discussion, the Council invited the Commission and the Monetary
Committee to monitor the implementation of the programme and to
report to the Council once concrete budgetary measures were defined in
the 1998 Budget Law.271
Recently the Commission, at Ecofin's request, assessed the
possibility of reinforcing these procedures. It considered that
convergence programmes 'have proven effective, and should remain the
                                                        
269 Agence Europe, No. 7002 (n.s.), Wednesday 25 June 1997, p 7. The assessment by
Agence Europe was rather less enthusiastic. While generally positive, it stated that
'The Council should nevertheless stress the absolute need, for the Italian authorities, to
stay on this track and respect the objectives they have set themselves paying special
attention to reducing social expenditure': Agence Europe, No. 7010 (n.s), Saturday 5
July 1997, p 6..
270 The Ecofin Council consists of the ministers of economy and finance of the Member
States. They constitute the Council for the purposes of EMU matters: see Declaration
No. 3 relative to the Third Part, Titles III and IV, of the Treaty establishing the
European Community, OJ 29.7.92 C191/98.
271 These and other conclusions by the Council are reported in Agence Europe, No. 7012
(n.s.), Wednesday 9 July 1997, p 8.
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pivot of the convergence process'.272 At the same time, however, it
underlined the importance of obtaining greater political commitment
from the Member States. To this end, it proposed to modify the format of
convergence programmes to include:
· a statement of key objectives and time horizon for their achievement;
· assumptions about the macroeconomic environment;
· policy measures to be taken;
· contingency measures in the event of slippage; and
· regular updating and, if. necessary, a specific date for submitting a
new programme.
The proposal rested on a triangular political and institutional bargain.
If a Member State made increased efforts, and if the Commission gave it
a positive recommendation, the Ecofin Council would politically endorse
the programme. In the institutional jockeying for power  which is
characteristic of the Community system, this might appear to redound
mainly to the benefit of the Commission. Less clear in its implications
was the Commission's proposal that Council endorsement would
require more effective monitoring, mainly by means of secondary
legislation. Monitoring and Ecofin recommendations for corrective
action where appropriate were to be the main elements of Community
surveillance.
The Commission also proposed that the targets and the
recommendations in the broad economic policy guidelines273 be made
more country-specific. Such a procedure would tend to merge more
closely the broad economic policy guidelines and the convergence
programmes. This could have the effect of narrowing the distinction
between economic policy and monetary policy within EMU so far as the
locus of decision-making is concerned.274 Thus it might increase the
weight of the European Council, Ecofin and the Commission in national
economic policy-making. It may also strengthen the partnership
                                                        
272 Commission Report to the Florence Summit, 'Preparation of Economic and
Monetary Union: A Review of the Situation (Communication by the Commission to the
European Council), in Europe Documents, No. 1992, 4 July 1997, p 4.
273 Formulated by the Council ex Article 103(2), first paragraph, and then, on the basis of
the Council's report, discussed to a conclusion by the European Council ex Article
103(2), second paragraph.
274 For example, see Snyder, 'EMU - Metaphor for European Union? Institutions, Rules
and Types of Regulation', in R. Dehousse (ed), Europe after Maastricht: An Ever
Closer Union? (Law Books in Europe, 1994), 63-99.
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between the Commission and national governments, implicating
governments in further two-level games and thus raising the stakes in
domestic politics, for example in Italy. Furthermore, it may also alter
the delicate balance between Germany and France as to the relationship
between economic policy and monetary policy.
The convergence programmes thus have proved a powerful
instrument of policy coordination. They have increasingly played a role
in the guidance, not to say negotiated direction, of national economic
policies by Community and Union institutions. In embryonic form, they
represent the potential development of a Union-wide economic policy-
making system, in particular by means of the coordination of national
fiscal and budgetary policies. Going further towards the centralisation of
economic policy within the European Union, several Member States
have reportedly asked the Commission to 'study the feasibility of linking
certain payments from the Community budget to developments in real
exchange rates and of introducing macroeconomic conditionality with
respect to Structural Fund payments.'275
Convergence programmes were designed originally to achieve the
general aims of EMU, in particular in so far as economic convergence,
according to the coronation theory, was merely a precondition to
monetary integration. At least this is what seems to emerge from the EC
Treaty. Furthermore, if one takes the Treaty literally, there would not
appear to be any necessary link between convergence programmes with
regard to monetary policy and multilateral surveillance with regard to
economic policy.276  It is true that economic convergence is a common
theme, albeit expressed as a means in relation to (the more
supranational) monetary policy and as an end in itself in relation to (the
more intergovernmental) economic policy.277 However, the policy
instruments in each case were distinct:278 information forwarded by the
                                                        
275 Commission Report to the Florence Summit, 'Preparation of Economic and
Monetary Union: A Review of the Situation (Communication by the Commission to the
European Council), in Europe Documents, No. 1992, 4 July 1997, p 4. As to the follow-up
of these proposals, see Commission Communication to the Council on reinforced
convergence procedures and a new exchange rate mechanism in stage three of EMU,
COM(96) 498 final; ESC Opinion on the impact of Economic and Monetary Union:
economic and social aspects of convergence and measures to increase awareness of the
single currency, CES 1089/96.
276 As to multilateral surveillance, see Art. 103(2)-(5), which is found in Title VI
Economic and Monetary Policy, Chapter 1 Economic Policy.
277 See also European Community, 1996 Annual Economic Report, COM(96) 86 final;
European Commission, Report on convergence in the European Union in 1996,
COM(96) 560 final.
278 At least if one does not discount for sloppy drafting of the Treaty, and consider that
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Member States and reports by the Commission in the field of economic
policy,279 and convergence programmes in the field of monetary policy.280
Nevertheless, in this instance at least, the legal texts have not stifled the
Community's institutional dynamics and reined in its policy
instruments. Convergence programmes have jumped the fence. As the
preceding discussion indicates, today they tend to serve the aims of both
monetary policy and economic policy. The institutional consequences of
the extension of the field of this policy instrument remain to be seen.  So
too do their consequences for relations between the Member States and
for different conceptions of the European Union.
Nevertheless, convergence programmes have an ambiguous, if
not anomalous, legal status. Though endorsed by Ecofin, they are not
published documents and are not the subject of any formal Community
decision. They remain national documents, not Community measures,
and in principle they are drafted by national authorities alone. Even
though they now play an important role in national and EU decision-
making, they are subject to few legal safeguards at Community or
national level. Convergence programmes thus raise potentially serious
problems of transparency, accountability, and democratic
participation.281
In view of the third stage of EMU, convergence programmes have
now been formally incorporated into the armoury of Community
instruments but in a confusing manner. The first implementing
regulation in respect of the Stability Pact concerns multilateral
surveillance.282 It sets out the  rules covering the submission,
examination and monitoring of stability programmes and convergence
programmes.283 Both types of programmes are stated to provide an
essential basis for price stability and for strong sustainable growth
conducive to employment creation.284 Roughly analogous rules apply to
                                                                                                                                                                
convergence programmes ex Art. 109e(2)(a), second indent, and information
forwarded by Member States ex Art. 103(3), second paragraph, are equivalent.
279 See Art. 103(3), first and second paragraphs, EC, respectively.
280 Art. 109e(2)(a), second indent, EC.
281 For example, in the United Kingdom convergence programmes have not been subject
to Parliamentary scrutiny: see Robert Brookes, 'Parliamentary Scrutiny of UK
Convergence Programmes: the One that Got Away', (1996) 2 Public Law 437-451.
282 Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic
policies, OJ 2.8.97 L209/1.
283 Ibid., art. 1. These programmes fufil the function of the presentation of information
for purposes of multilateral surveillance, in the terms of Art. 103(3), second paragraph,
EC: see Preamble, seventh recital, and arts. 3(1) and 4(1)..
284 Ibid., arts. 3(1), 7(1).
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both types of programmes. However, the requirements for stability
programmes and for convergence programmes apply to different groups
of Member States. Stability programmes are to be submitted by Member
States which are participating in the single currency.285 It is assumed
that, in accordance with Article 109j EC, they will have already have
achieved a high degree of economic convergence and a sustainable
government financial position.286 In contrast, convergence programmes
are to be submitted by the Member States not adopting the single
currency.287 It is assumed that these Member States 'will need to pursue
policies aimed at a high degree of sustainable convergence',288 if only
because all Member States are committed to budgetary positions or close
to balance or in surplus.289
Stability programmes must be submitted before 1 March 1999290
and convergence programmes before 1 May 1999.291 The programme
must contain specified, detailed information on the Member State's
budgetary position and price stability in the case of a stability
programme292 or on variables related to convergence in the case of a
convergence programme.293It must updated annually and made public.294
Within two months of the submission of the programme, and on
the basis of assessments by the Commission and the Monetary
Committee,295 the Council must examine the programme within the
framework of multilateral surveillance under Article 103 EC.296 It must
examine
                                                        
285 Ibid., art. 3(1).
286 See ibid ., Preamble, eighth recital.
287 Ibid., art. 7(1).
288 Ibid., Preamble, ninth recital.
289 Ibid., Preamble, second recital.
290 Ibid., art. 4(1).
291 Ibid., art. 8(1).
292 As to this information, see ibid.,  art. 3(2), (3). In addition to assumptions and policy
measures, it includes the medium-term objective for the budgetary position of close to
balance or in surplus, the adjustment path towards this objective for the general
government surplus/deficit,, and the expected path of the general government debt
ratio: see ibid.,  art. 3(2)(a).
293 As to this information, see ibid.,  art. 7(2), (3). In addition to assumptions and policy
measures, it includes the medium-term objective for  the budgetary position of close to
balance or in surplus, the adjustment path towards this objective for the general
government surplus/deficit, the expected path for the general government debt ratio, the
medium-term monetary policy objectives, and the relationship of those objectives to
price and exchange rate stability: see ibid., art. 7(2)(a).
294 Ibid., arts. 4 (stability programmes), 8 (convergence programmes).
295 The Committee is set up by Art. 109c(1) EC.
296 Council Regulation 1466/97, art. 5(1), first paragraph (stability programmes), art.
9(1) (convergence programmes), OJ 2.8.97 L209/1..
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· whether the Member State's medium-term budget objective provides
for a safety margin to ensure avoidance of an excessive deficit,
· whether the economic assumptions underlying the programme are
realistic, and
· whether the measures being taken and/or proposed are sufficient to
achieve the targeted adjustment path.297
 It must also examine
· whether the contents of the programme facilitate closer coordination
of economic policies, and
· whether the Member State's economic policy is consistent with the
broad economic policy guidelines.298
The Council is required to monitor the implementation of the
programmes.299 In addition, in the case of convergence programmes, the
Council must monitor the economic policies of non-participating
Member States in the light of the convergence programme objectives
with a view to ensuring that their policies are geared to stability, and
thus to avoid real exchange rate misalignments and excessive nominal
exchange rate fluctuations.300In the event of a significant divergence
between the budgetary position and the medium-term objective or
adjustment path, it must give early warning in the form of a
recommendation based on Article 103(4) EC.301 If the problem persists,
the Council must make a recommendation to the Member State to take
prompt correction measures and may make the recommendation
public.302 In accordance with Article 103(4) EC, the President of the
                                                        
297 Ibid., art. 5(1), first paragraph (stability programmes), art. 9(1), first paragraph
(convergence programmes)..
298 Ibid., art. 5(1), second paragraph (stability programmes), art. 9(1), second paragraph
(convergence programmes). As to the broad economic guidelines, adopted on the basis
of Art. 103(2) EC, see Council Recommendation of 7 July 1997 on the broad economic
guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Community, OJ
2.8.97 L209/12.
299 Ibid., art. 6(1) (stability programmes), art. 10(1), first paragraph (convergence
programmes).
300 Ibid., art. 10(1), second paragraph.
301 Ibid., art. 6(2) (stability programmes), art. 10(2) (convergence programmes).
302 Ibid., art. 6(3) (stability programmes) art. 10(3) (convergence programmes). Note
that while Art. 103(4) provides that the Council 'may' make a recommendation,
Council Regulation1466/97 states that the Council 'shall' make such a
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Council and the Commission must include the results of their
multilateral surveillance in their report to the European Parliament.303
(F)  THE LEGITIMACY OF EMU
The legitimacy of EMU is closely bound up with the nature and function
of its institutions, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European
System of Central Banks (ESCB).304 In order to untangle a complex
debate, it is useful to distinguish between credibility, legitimacy and
accountability. Credibility refers to the belief that an institution will
carry out properly the functions entrusted to it, while legitimacy refers to
the belief that a specific institution is widely recognised or at least
accepted as being the appropriate institution to exercise specific powers.
Accountability refers to the fact that the institution is, or is deemed
widely to be, more or less responsive, directly or indirectly, to the people
who are affected by its decisions. In the case of the ECB, the three
concepts are empirically interrelated but analytically distinct. With
them in mind, the following paragraphs consider (a) the credibility of
the ECB, (b) the potential impact of a uniform monetary policy in a
highly diverse set of economies, (c) the potential political implications of
the Bundesbank model, and (d) the accountability of the ECB.
Credibility is widely recognised as a crucial determinant in the
eventual success or failure of the ECB.305 The term 'credibility' refers
essentially to whether or not the addressees of the ECB trust the ECB and
believe that it is capable of carrying out its legal mandate, in particular
achieving its primary objective of maintaining price stability.306 The
addressees of the ECB include not merely the banking public, but also
                                                                                                                                                                
recommendation. Both provide that the Council 'may' make the recommendation
public.
303 Ibid., art. 12.
304 See in particular R. Schmit, The European Central Bank:Institutional Aspects.
Kluwer, 1997). See also Hugo J. Hahn, 'The European Central Bank: Key to European
Monetary Union or Target', (1991) 28 Common Market Law Review 783-820. As to the
background, see Vers un système européen de banques centrales: Projet de dispositions
organiques (Rapport du groupe présidé par Jean-Victor Louis) (1990).
305As to the literature on credibility, see  Persson and Tabellini, Macroeconomic Policy,
Credibility and Politics (Harwood Academic Publishers, 1990); A.Cukierman, Central
Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence (MIT Press,
1992); Giavazzi and Pagano 'The Advantage of Tying One's Hands. EMS Discipline
and Central Bank Credibility'  (1988)  32 European Economic Review. Note however
that Winkler concludes that 'Unfortunately, the credibility literature has nothing
substantial to say about the ultimate sources of credibility’: see B. Winkler, Towards a
Strategic View on EMU: A Critical Survey (European University Institute, working
paper RSC No. 95/18, 1995), p 7.
306 See Art. 3a(2) EC.
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and in particular national central bankers, financial institutions, and
economic policy-makers. The Maastricht Treaty sought to assure the
credibility of the ECB by providing for ECB independence, in the sense of
independence from control of monetary decision-making by political
authorities.307 Artis and Winkler argue that the Stability Pact had a
similar purpose.308 Such a strategy appears to be consistent with the
evidence based on economic research.309 But it neglects other aspects of
credibility, such as historical experience, participation in the same
political culture, an economic culture of price stability and low inflation,
and embeddedness in a  trusted political system. Its main aim  was to
reach a compromise between the credibility of the ECB and what is often
called the 'symmetry' of the system, namely the distribution of power
between monetary and political authorities.310  Whether this compromise
will prove sufficient to meet the competing demands which will placed
on it remains to be seen.
There is thus a tension between credibility and legitimacy. This is
exemplified first in the fact that each addresses a different audience, as
seen in the Maastricht compromise between credibility and symmetry.
Another example of the same tension is manifested in the potential
contradiction between uniformity and diversity. Regardless of the
existence of similar 'house cultures' of the various national central
banks and the long-standing cooperation between them in specialist
committees and networks, the various national banks operate in
                                                        
307 This was consistent with the Commission's view that the credibility of the ECB would
not be problematic because of the ECB's pivotal role in a system of central banks which
had already demonstrated their commitment to price stability and its statutory
independence and legally prescribed priorities. See European Commission, External
Effects of Economic and Monetary Union (Commission Staff Working Document),
Europe Documents No 2034, 8 May 1997).
308 Michael J Artis and Bernhard Winkler, 'The Stability Pact: Safeguarding the
Credibility of the European Central Bank',Discussion Paper No. 1688, Centre for
Economic Policy Research, August 1997.
309 ‘Empirical evidence from 17 developed countries during the period 1973-86 by
Alesina (1989) appears to support the contention that the more independence a central
bank has, the more likely it is to be successful in combating inflation at a lower cost in
unemployment....In such a complex matter as inflation it may be dangerous to make
such a simple connection between inflation and central bank independence. The
central bank may be operating discretionary policy but the more independent of
government influence a central bank is the more its inflationary stance is likely to be
believed’. A. Alesina, ‘Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies’,
Economic Policy, no. 8, April 1989.
310 See B. Winkler,  Towards a Strategic View on EMU: A Critical Survey (European
University Institute, working paper RSC No 95/18, 1995) p 8-10, who argues that the
'independence' solution to the credibility problem is insufficient and will require the
development of stronger European political institutions.
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different national political systems and political cultures, leaving aside
the recent emergence due partly to EMU of a shared economic culture of
low inflation and stable prices. Yet the polity, political culture and legal
culture of the EU are for the moment in their infancy or at least differ
substantially from those of the Member States.
In this context, an important concern regarding legitimacy stems
from the view that EMU and  the constitutionally mandated policies of
the ECB may have very different effects in different Member States. The
legal and institutional framework of EMU may be too rigid to cope with
national diversity.  It is open to serious doubt whether the same interest
rate is really suitable for all participants in the single currency, given
existing differences among national economic growth rates,  banking
and industrial structures, and degree of openness to foreign trade.311
Such rigidity may be especially nefarious in the case of unforeseen
economic shocks. These shocks may magnify existing forms of
differentiation or create new differences as a result of the inability of  the
individual Member States to have recourse to their traditional monetary
policy instruments. In addition, arrangements in addition to the new
convergence programme requirements to cope with relations between
the 'ins' and the 'outs'. 312A further element is that of enlargement,
which considering that EMU is part of the acquis communautaire will
require careful management if it is not to place EMU at risk.313
A third preoccupation with regard to the legitimacy of EMU
concerns the Bundesbank model. While the independence of the ECB
and the lack of a real 'economic government' at EU level have been
                                                        
311 See 'Can one size fit all?', The Economist, March 28 1998, p 82, reviewing  Ramana
Ramaswamy and Torsten Sloek. 'The Real Effects of Monetary Policy in the European
Union: What are the Differences?, IMF Working Paper No. 160, December 1997, and
Rudiger Dornbusch, Carlo Favero, and Francesco Giavazzi, 'A Red Letter Day?, CEPR
Discussion Paper No. 1804, February 1998. See also D.R.R. Dunnett 'Legal and
Institutional Issues affecting Economic and Monetary Union in David O'Keeffe and
Patrick Twomey (eds) Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (Chancery Law
Publishing,  1994), p 143; B. Winkler, Towards a Strategic View on EMU: A Critical
Survey (European University Institute, working paper RSC No.95/18, 1995), pp 4-5.
312 For reasons of space it is not possible to deal with this important topic here. See
however John A.A. Arrowsmsith, 'La non-participation à la phase 3: La vie à l'étage
inférieur de l'UEM', (1996) 36 Revue de l'Economie financière 185-202; Filip
Tuytschaever, 'The Changing Conception of Differentiation in EU Law, draft PhD
Thesis, European University Institute, Florence.
313 See Philippe Vigneron and Philippe Steinfeld, 'The Enlargement of the EU and
EMU: Some Legal Considerations', (1998) 13 Butterworths Journal of International
Banking and Financial Law  18-21. See also Fritz Breuss, 'The Impact of EMU on
External Trade Relations with CEECs', presented at the Third ECSA-World
Conference, 'The European Union in a Changing World', Briussels, 19-20 September
1996.
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identified as important concerns, these two points are often simply a
shorthand for reluctance or indeed opposition regarding the adoption of
the German Bundesbank model as the institutional model for the ECB.
Leaving aside the fact that this model is criticised most frequently by
people from Member States other than Germany, there is a real question
as to whether it is the most appropriate in the very different legal,
institutional and political arrangement of the European Union. Put
simply, the Bundesbank in Germany operates within a specific
historical, political and legal context,314 but the salient features of this
specific context do not have any obvious counterpart in the EU taken as a
whole. In the early 1990s the Bundesbank's official pronouncements
stated that 'In the final analysis, a Monetary Union is an irrevocable
joint and several community which, in the light of past experience,
requires a more far-reaching association, in the form of a
comprehensive political union, if it is to be durable'.315 We can read this
pronouncement as an attempt to recreate at least some of the features of
the specific German context within the EU as a whole. Individuals and
organisations from other Member States, as already seen, have different
visions of the desirable EU polity.
A fourth aspect of the debate regarding the legitimacy of EMU
concerns the relationship between legitimacy, democracy and
accountability. The German Federal Constitutional Court in its
'Maastricht judgment' treated the autonomy of the ECB as 'a
modification of the democratic principle for the purpose of protecting the
confidence in the redemption value of a currency'.316 To what extent is
this justified, or, in other words, what does the democratic principle
mean in the context of monetary policy?
 Two different views are presented by Gormley and de Haan, on the
one hand, and Verdun, on the other hand. The former argue that the
                                                        
314 See David Marsh, The Bundesbank: The Bank that Rules Europe (Heineman, 1992);
Ellen Kennedy, The Bundesbank: German's Central Bank in the International
Monetary System (Pinter,  1991).
315 'Statement by the Deutsche Bundesbank on the establishment of an Economic and
Monetary Union in Europe', Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank, vol. 42, 10
October 1990, p 40, quoted in Daniel Wincott, 'The European Central Bank:
Constitutional Dimensions and Political Limits', (1992) 11 International Relations
111-126 at p 123.
316 Manfred Brunner and Others v The European Union Treaty (Cases 2 BvR 2134/R/92
& 2159/92 before the Bundesverfassungsgericht (2. Senat) (German Federal
Constitutional Court, 2nd  Chamber) (1994) 1 CMLR 57 at 104 (para. 96). See also Matthias
Herdegen, 'Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court: Constitutional
Restraints for an "Ever Closer Union"', (1994) 31 Common Market Law Review 235-249
at p 247.
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objectives of monetary policy should be decided according to normal
democratic procedures and then monetary policy should be delegated to
the ECB. Based on this view, they conclude that ECB falls short of
democratic accountability. They propose that the ECB should be more
accountable to the European Parliament, which should also be involved
by means of the co-decision procedure in elaborating the ECB legislative
framework.317 Verdun argues that the democratic deficit of EMU stems
from three factors: lack of parliamentary accountability, lack of
transparency, and the asymmetrical development of monetary policy, on
the one hand, and political, budgetary or fiscal integration, on the other
hand. In evaluating this state of affairs, she emphasises the importance
of considering the alternatives, namely the status quo or 'non-EMU', in
which most Member States have only limited influence over monetary
policy. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of EMU could become problematic if
more people oppose ECB policies, because the Treaty is relatively rigid
and the EU has few redistributive mechanisms. Consequently she
argues in favour of a broader transformation of the EU polity in the long
run.318
It may be suggested that these changes have already begun. On
the one hand, the European Parliament has asked for greater power
with regard to the ECB, first for regular testimony by the ECB President,
and ultimately for a formal veto power over the members of the ECB
executive board.319 This presages a struggle for power among the EU/EC
institutions. On the other hand, the European Council has played an
extremely significant role in the run-up to the third stage of EMU. In my
                                                        
317 Laurence Gormley and Jakob de Haan, 'The Democratic Deficit of the European
Central Bank', (1996) 21 European Law Review 95-112. See also Peter Kenen, Economic
and Monetary Union in Europe: Moving beyond Maastricht (Cambridge University
Press, 1995), p 42, and Christopher Taylor, 'The Role and Status of the European Central
Bank: Some Proposals for Accountability and Cooperation', presented in the Workshop
on 'The Political and Institutional Deficits of the European Integration Process,
European Forum, European University Institute, Florence, 30-31 May 1997.
318 Amy Verdun, 'The Democratic Deficit of EMU', paper presented in the European
Forum, European University Institute, Florence, 31 January 1997.See also Guido
Montani, 'Moneta europea, riforma dello Stato del benessere e democrazia economica',
(1990) 32 Il Federalista 199-239; Rolf Knieper, 'The Sovereignty of Money: Legal
Problems of European Monetary Integration', (1991) 19 International Journal of the
Sociology of Law 121-148. In addition, as Harden points out, Ecofin has no democratic
legitimacy of its own, and the ECB does not have the powers or the appropriate form of
accountability to serve as the 'economic government' of the Community: see Ian
Harden, 'The European Central Bank and the Role of National Central Banks in
Economic and Monetary Union', in Karl Gretschmann (ed), Economic and Monetary
Union: Implications for National Policy-Makers (European Institute of Public
Administration, 1993), pp 149-163 at p 163.
319 'EU Notebook', The Wall Street Journal Europe, Thursday, April 2, 1998, p 1.
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view, this signals a more general transformation in the distribution of
power in the EU system of multilevel governance, and in particular a
closer engagement and greater interpenetration of the national and EU
political arenas. It is an example of increased legitimation without
increased democratisation.  EMU thus can be seen as process of
institutional choice320 or institutional learning, but sometimes with
unintended consequences.
In considering the legitimacy of EMU in social terms rather than
merely in procedural terms, one needs to distinguish between three
different senses of legitimacy: legitimacy within certain technical task-
specific limits; conditional legitimacy, for example legitimacy which is
conditional on future developments such as the emergence of more
overtly political institutions of governance; and legitimacy tout court.
The first position is closest to that of the German Federal Constitutional
Court, both as regards EMU and as regards the EU in general, or more
recently the views of Majone regarding powers delegated to executive
agencies.321 The second position is reminiscent of the views of Gormley
and de Haan, on the one hand, and Verdun, on the other hand.
The third position is strengthened by three current factors
regarding EMU. One is the emergence of an emphasis on low inflation
and price stability as an increasingly important shared feature of EU
economic/political/legal culture. The other is the importance of the
European Council as the primary motor and steering mechanism of the
EU policy. The last is the increasing voice being given to the idea that
EMU in general, and the convergence criteria in particular, should
include an express reference to the objective of increasing employment.322
Taken together, these three elements may presage broader
constitutional changes in the EU as a result of EMU, unless
uncontrollable economic shocks result in increased economic
                                                        
320 In the sense used by Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions
in Law, Economics, and Public Policy  (University of Chicago Press, 1994).
321 See for example Giandomenico Majone, 'From the Positive to the Regulatory State:
Changes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance', (1997) 127 Jounral
of Public Policy 139-167, and his forthcoming article in (1998) 4 European Law Journal,
in press..
322 See e.g. Brian Bercusson et al, A Manifesto for Social Europe (European Trade
Union Institute, 1996); Roger Blanpain et al, Fundamental Social Rights: Proposals for
the European Union (Peeters, 1996); Vincenzo Guizzi, 'Il Ruolo del Parlamento Europeo
in materia di integrazione economica e monetaria', (1996) 1 Rivista di Diritto Europeo
3-11 at p 10.
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differentiation, a loss of ECB credibility, and widespread political
opposition to EMU, including its legal framework.323
.
4. CONCLUSION
A Dutch journalist has written a surprising whodunnit about European
economic and monetary union (EMU).324 I hope we non-Dutch speakers
can all soon enjoy a translation. In the meantime, I have tried in this
article to excavate some of the principal legal issues raised by the saga of
EMU. My purpose has been neither to treat EMU from the standpoint
that  '... the introduction of the euro will be the crowning of economic
integration and the rocket launcher of political union,'325 nor to reflect
the more critical assessment that it creates unconstitutional 'forms of
factual compulsion, which in practical terms will make the journey
towards European union irreversible'.326 Instead I have focused on the
legal evolution of EMU, how to explain it theoretically, and some of its
main characteristics from a broader constitutional perspective.
The legal aspects of EMU are sometimes extremely controversial,
either in public or behind the closed doors of diplomatic and monetary
negotiations. Legal and other technical debates often as a kind of
shorthand for political disagreement. Competing economic theories
frequently play the same role.327 This was the case long before EMU was
set as a priority European Union objective.328 This does not mean, of
                                                        
323 In other words, pace Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political Economy of Monetary
Union', in Peter B. Kenen (Ed),: Understanding Interdependence: The
Macroeconomics of the Open (Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 478, the political
concerns in respect of EMU are not at all trivial, and the importance of EMU cannot be
reduced simply to the interconnection with monetary policy and other policies such as
the single market or trade policy..
324 Roel Janssen, De Struisvogel Code (The Ostrich Code) (Balans, 1996), reviewed by
James Morgan, 'Death and the Emu', Financial Times , Weekend June 28/29 1997 p VI
Weekend FT.
325 Jacques Delors, in Nouvel Observateur, No 1699, 1997, quoted in Agence Europe, No.
6990 (n.s.), Saturday 7 June 1997 p 2.
326 Argument of the complainants, in Manfred Brunner and Others v The European
Union Treaty (Cases 2 BfR 2134/92 & 2159/92) before the Bundesverfassungsgericht (2.
Senat) (German Federal Constitutional Court, 2nd  Chamber) (1994) 1 CMLR 57 at 73, 75.
See also B. Moss (ed), The Single European Currency in National Perspective: A
Community in Crisis? (in press).
327 See Kenneth Dyson, Elusive Union: The Process of Economic and Monetary Union
in Europe (Longman, 1994).
328 To the effect that EMU was formally a Community objective before the Maastricht
Treaty, see Opinion 1/91 Opinion delivered pursuant to the Second subparagraph of
Article 208(1) of the Treaty. Draft Agreement between the Community on the one hand
and the countries of EFTA on the other, relating to the creation of European Economic
Area,  1991 ECR I-6079. As to the Maastricht Treaty, see Treaty on European Union,
Preamble 6th recital, Art. B 2nd  indent TEU, Art. 2 EC. See generally Snyder, 'EMU -
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course, that all legal aspects of EMU have been or are politically
controversial. But, in the future also, political conflicts about EMU are
likely often to appear in legal camouflage. This dialectical relationship
between politics and law, political discourse and monetary discourse,
and political discourse and legal discourse should not be surprising. The
driving force in EMU, including its main legal aspects, has always been
politics.329
The intimate connection between law and politics in EMU is likely
to remain even after 1 January 1999. This is the date currently envisaged
for the start of the third stage of EMU. It is the decisive step towards a
single currency, when nominal exchange rates will be irrevocably
fixed330 between the currencies of the participating EU Member States.
The Maastricht Treaty provided for the possibility of an earlier date.331
However, in December 1996 the Council of the European Union decided
that a majority of Member States did not fulfil the necessary conditions
for the adoption of the single currency.332 Consequently, the default
position laid down in the Treaty for the start of the third stage applies.333
                                                                                                                                                                
Metaphor for European Union? Institutions, Rules  and Types of Regulation', in R.
Dehousse (ed), Europe after Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union? (Law Books in Europe,
1994), 63-99.
329 For example, see Gretschmann, Kotz and Sleijpen, 'The European Monetary System:
The Geography of Economics versus the Politics of Money?, in K. Gretschmann (ed),
Economic and Monetary Union: Implications for National Policy-Makers (Nifhoff for
the European Institute of Public Administration, 1993), 27-49 at 28; Loukas Tsoukalis,
'Economic and Monetary Union', in H. Wallace and W. Wallace (eds), Policy-
Making in the European Union (Oxford, 3rd  ed. 1996) 279-299 at 280; Barry Eichengreen
and John Frieden,The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification
(Westview Press, 1995), at 89; Charles A.E. Goodhart, 'The Political Economy of
Monetary Union', in Peter B. Kenen (Ed),: Understanding Interdependence: The
Macroeconomics of the Open (Princeton University Press, 1995), at 448; Fratianni and
Waller, The Mastricht Way to EMU (Princeton University, International Finance
Section, June 1992, Princeton Essays in International Finance, No. 187),  1-2; Bernard
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Guerrieri and Pier Carlo Padoan, L'Economia Politica dell'Integrazione Europea  (Il
Mulino, 1988); Bernard Moss (ed), The Single European Currency in National
Perspective: A Community in Crisis? (forthcoming)..
330 Article 109l(4) EC.
331 Article 109j(3) EC.
332 Council Decision (EC) 96/736 in accordance with Article 109j(3) of the EC Treaty on
entry into the third stage of EMU, OJ 24.12.96 L335/48.  The Decision was taken by the
Council meeting in the composition of the Heads of State and Government. It was based
on an assessment by the Ecofin Council under Article 109j(3) EC, following a
recomendation by the Commission. As to this assessment, see the Report by the Ecofin
Council to the European Council, 'The Preparations for Stage 3 of EMU', Annex 1,
Europe Documents, No 2015/16, 18 December 1996, p 7). According to Article 109j(3) the
Council was also required to take due account also of the opinion of the European
Parliament.
333 That is, 1 January 1999: see Article 109j(4) EC.
© 1998 Francis Snyder
82
Recently (as of the date of writing), the list of Member States that are
initially to participate in the single currency has been determined.334
We can understand the evolution of EMU as a combination of two-
level games involving an epistemic community. What remains to be
explained, however, is why EMU provoked such intense reactions, thus
contributing so much to the politicisation of EU law and thus to the
development of the EU as a polity and as a constitutional system.
In my view, the scale and depth of the response to EMU stemmed
from four main conjunctural, and partly overlapping, reasons, which
evoked widespread reactions at the individual, organisation and societal
levels. (a) EMU  coincided with the spread of deflationary economic
policies, widely described, perhaps prematurely,  as 'the end of
inflation'.335 (b) It also coincided with the Maastricht debate on the future
of European integration, raising issues of legitimacy, democracy, and
the fashioning of political institutions suitable for an increasingly
complex system of multi-level governance. (c) It coincided with the
uneven effects of globalisation within (and on) the EU Member States,
thus stimulating a debate on European values, the welfare state, and the
European model of society. (d) In the face of these challenges, EMU
seemed to leave the emperor naked. Despite initial attempts to establish
an EU fiscal policy alongside EMU, or even to situate EMU within a
strong EU polity, EMU as eventually agreed was a ‘victim of narrow
conceptualisation of money as essentially an economic and technical
phenomenon’ .336  By focusing solely on monetary policy, it removed from
Member States certain basic policy instruments for dealing with
economic shocks, without creating sufficient new equilibrating
instruments at European level. In doing so, however, it neglected
popular political culture and eschewed wide political debate.
                                                        
334 As to the Commission report, see European Commission, 'Euro 1999: Report on
progress towards convergence and the recommendation with a view to  the transition to
the third stage of economic and monetary union, Part 1: Recommendation (25 March
1999) (Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities,
1998). The European Council finalised the list of participating Member States at the end
of March or early April 1998: see Agence Europe, No. 7213 (n.s.), Special Edition,
Sunday, 3 May 1998.
335 As to these policies, see the best-selling book by R. Bootle, The Death of Inflation:
Surviving and Thriving in the Zero Era (1996, paperback edition 1997, Nicholas
Brealey Publishing). For a more cautious assessment, see David Hackett Fischer, The
Great Wave: Price Revolutions and the Rhythm of History (Oxford University Press,
1996), pp 233-234.
336 Kenneth Dyson, Elusive Union: The Process of Economic and Monetary Union in
Europe  (Longman, 1994),  p xi.
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Set in its broader context, therefore, EMU has served both as a
stimulant and as a proxy for broader debates about monetary policy
decision-making, the future of European integration, and the meaning
and effects of globalisation. It is instructive to recall the extent to
which the search for ‘capitalism with European characteristics’ was in
fact fuelled by the proposals and preparation for EMU. They made clear
not only the inconsistency between the governance of monetary policy at
EU level and that of fiscal policy at national level. They also revealed,
more clearly and indeed more frighteningly than ever before, the fact
that the EU does not really have any strong stabilisation or redistributive
function, in other words, any strong 'social' function. Whether true or
not, it is widely believed that globalisation has led to the end of inflation.
In the EU and abroad, the German Bundesbank is generally seen as the
champion of deflationary monetary policy.  The spectre of a Buba-
dominated EMU thus generated strong political reactions. Globalisation,
deflationary monetary policy and EMU are often considered to be
inextricably intertwined. For ordinary people, they seem to have (and in
fact may have) similar implications, notably  with regard to changes in
the nature of work, job insecurity, and potential or actual
unemployment. Seen from this perspective, EMU can be viewed as a
threat to personal identity.
In addition, it has become increasingly obvious that the EU's
economic strength and political weakness are both due mainly, though
not only, to national governments. As a consequence,  the policies of
Member States towards the EU become increasingly controversial
among national electorates, and  EU policies and EMU in particular
have become highly politicised. This has involved a fierce debate about
whether the Member States are giving up their economic policy
instruments without anything to replace them at the EU level of
governance. For once, the debate has not been limited to experts. As a
result, it has raised issues about democracy, legitimacy and
accountability of EMU decisions without a representative political
master. A lay person may be shocked to be reminded that the debate
among experts began as early as the late 1960s. The two schools of
thought about monetary policy, monetarists and economists, then
diverged not only about the technical aspects of the governance of the
economy but also about the extent of the aims, architecture and identity
of an integrated Europe. Now, however,  this debate is part of mass
politics, and it is not limited to  European economic integration. It also
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concerns European political integration, the nature and survival of the
social welfare state, and the identity of the EU in a global context.
By stimulating the politicisation of EU policies and law, EMU has
contributed directly to the development of the EU as a polity and a
constitutional system. This contribution can be summarised in nine
points.
(1) The Stability Pact, and indeed EMU as a whole, exemplifies
significant recent trends in the development of the EU constitution.  The
EU is in the midst of changes toward increased multi-level governance
and greater institutional heterogeneity. This is especially the case
regarding political sensitive issues, such as EMU. In this case the
approfondissement of multi-level governance means specifically the
greater interpenetration of the EU and national political systems. The
gradual emergence of a new configuration of EU politics thus is closely
intertwined with developments in and across national political systems.
In the past, this relationship between two levels of governance might
have been seen as antagonistic. Now, however, it has become dialectical.
(2) This dialectical interaction between different levels of
governance  involves a two-fold dilemma that in the EC has been well-
known for years. This concerns the choice of level of governance, on the
one hand, and the type of economy, on the other hand.337 The former
involves the question as to whether the EC or the Member States should
take action, while the latter concerns the extent of governmental action,
that is, the relationship between state and market.
As I have tried to suggest in this article, however, EMU
reconfigures and reconstitutes this dilemma in a strikingly new form.
The first leg of the dilemma, which concerns levels of governance, no
longer poses - if it ever did - such a clear choice between two sharp
alternatives. Reality can no longer be captured by a simple reference to
the end points on a spectrum. The evolution of EMU demonstrates that
practice, usually if not always, involves a complex combination of
elements of both and indeed more than two levels; in fact, one can go
further to add that EMU shows the metaphor of levels should be replaced
by the notion of polycentricity. Now a serious intellectual effort needs to
be made to come to grips with this polycentricity, including EMU, in
constitutional terms.
                                                        
337 See also my article on 'Monetary Union: A Metaphor for European Union?
Institutions, Rules and Types of Regulation', in R. Dehousse (ed), Europe after
Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union? (1994), pp 63-99 at 83.
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 The second leg of the dilemma has been altered even more
profoundly. It no longer refers to the form of economy, that is, concerned
with the extent of state intervention in the market seen as a technocratic
issue. Instead, even if we choose to retain this old language, we must see
this leg of the dilemma as quintessentially political. Not only does it
inevitably involve some combination of state and market. More
fundamentally, it concerns what are essentially political questions,
concerning the use of power, the choice of values, and the determination
of the basic features of  polity, society and identity.
(3) These changes have fostered  the increasing politicisation of
the EU itself. This has led less, however, to the increasing
democratisation of  the EC and the institutions within the EC framework
than to the strengthening of the EU institutions, and particularly the
European Council. The European Council has increasingly assumed the
roles of both gatekeeper and channel. In contrast to the Commission, the
Council, the European courts, or the even the European Parliament, it
can drawn on the resources of both the EU and the national political
arenas. These arenas are increasingly overlapping and interconnected,
but so far at least the European Council has a unique and in both arenas
an overtly political role. To some extent, it thus can foster or retard the
processes which might tend to merge these arenas, in other words
European political integration. The European Council by no means has
a monopoly of EU politics. As events regarding EMU in France,
Germany and Italy among other Member States have shown, it is still
possible to scendere in piazza.
(4) The role of the European Council fosters greater
interpenetration between the EU and national political systems. It has in
my view also strengthened the EU, as distinct from the EC, as the legal
framework which is of constitutional salience, though not necessarily
legal relevance, to citizens (and others). But the development of EMU has
not necessarily improved the democratic character of the four main
European Community institutions. Instead, we can see the European
Council as representing a conjunction of (various national) democratic
systems and acting, according to the principle of single institutional
framework, as a real  institution of the European Community. At least
in the case of EMU, the increased role of the European Council thus is a
sign of the emergence of EU politics. But the strengthening of the
European Council also serves as a surrogate for political changes in EC
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institutions. It represents a form of increased legitimation without
increased democratisation.
(5) EMU may potentially result in a qualitative transformation of
the EU constitution. This effect can be seen as the political and legal side
of the coin of which the other side is the lowering of microeconomic
transaction costs. It involves the development of certain
constitutionalising processes, notably the creation of forms of social
solidarity which have long existed within national boundaries but
which, up to now, are relatively little developed on an EU scale. I refer,
in particular but not only, to the identities of class and other forms of
social and economic differentiation. Seen in the light of EMU, these are
types of identity and potentially forms of political loyalty which are non-
national in character and cut across national boundaries. Doubtless
there are other forms of social solidarity and other types of identity
which share these characteristics.
(6) EMU has already stimulated or reinforced the development of
certain aspects of an EU legal or constitutional culture. Of special
importance are the value placed on low inflation and price stability; the
placing of employment and thus the welfare state model at the centre of
public attention; and the strengthening of the European Council as a
central institution in European integration. The latter reinforces the
idea that Member States are Masters of the Treaty, but it does so in an
unusual way, namely by emphasising that the Masters of the Treaty are
the Member States not individually but acting together. This is a crucial
point in the development of a new EU constitutional culture.
(7) The example of the Stability Pact illustrates closer forms of
cooperation between the European institutions and the Member States.
European Council guidelines aim to, and in effect do, bind the Council,
the Commission and the Member States. Under the aegis of the
European Council, the Ecofin has enacted regulations which provide for
relations and procedures involving the Council, the Commission and the
Monetary Committee in very precise detail. National administrations
are increasingly channelled and constrained, for example, in respect of
the EMU convergence criteria. Nor are these solely administrative
issues. The cooperation between EU and national institutions is highly
political, for example within the European Council and Ecofin.
Similarly, the enforcement of EC law regarding EMU has a very direct
and dramatic impact, often a restructuring impact, on national political
institutions and processes.
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 (8) The processes, tools and techniques involved so far in ensuring
the effectiveness of EMU are  quite heterogeneous. Three points in
particular deserve to be emphasised. One is the use of European Council
conclusions as strong political guidelines, even though in theory they
have no legal force. Here their force derives partly from the position of
the European Council in the hierarchy of EU institutions. It also derives
however from its direct links with national political systems in the
Member States.
In addition, a frequently used legal technique involves what we
can call 'nested norms'. This is a kind of Russian doll of rules, with
European Council political guidelines on the outside, and a series of
increasingly detailed legally binding rules on the inside. Only the latter
have legal force, but they take their political and social meaning, hence
their effectiveness in practice, from the former. In other words, the
effectiveness of EU/EC measures depends on the existence of a common
political framework at EU level, on the one hand, and on the fact that
this political framework is deeply rooted in and ultimately derives its
legitimacy from the individual national political systems of the Member
States, on the other hand.
Furthermore, EMU also exemplifies the use of much more
detailed rules and tighter deadlines. The adoption and subsequent
effectiveness of these measures is facilitated by the emergence of
stronger EU political institutions, notably the European Council. Seen
from the standpoint of compliance with law, this can be viewed as an
example of harmonisation, not only of legal rules and administrative
practice but also of national economic systems, economic ideologies and
political cultures. Their contribution to the development of an EU
constitutional culture remains to be analysed.
(9) EMU is a high-risk political strategy. It is so intertwined with
the future of the EU that, if it fails, European integration as we know it
may be in danger. The evolution of EMU thus illustrates the extremely
complex, often contradictory nature of the real constitutionalisation of
European integration.338 This involves not just the elaboration and
application of legal principles, but also the development of numerous
constitutionalising processes and the gradual emergence of an EU
constitutional culture. If our question is 'are we making a constitution?',
                                                        
338 The progress of EMU from the EU standpoint can be followed on the following
webstites: (1)  http://www.europa.eu.int/pol/emu/en/emu.htm; (2) http://www.euro-
emu.co.uk
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the study of the evolution of EMU leads us to answer 'yes'. If, however,
our question is 'what constitution are we making?', this article has
suggested that, within certain limits, only politics will tell.
